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ABSTRACT 
Recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) direct the 
development of new concepts to prioritize linking budgeting and programming for near- 
and mid-term resource allocation planning.  For the Department of Defense (DoD), 
planning that falls within the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) or 0-7 years may be 
viewed as mid-term.  This thesis raises the question of whether these new concepts will 
work best for the Department of the Navy (DON) or whether another methodology would 
better fit the Navy’s near- and mid-term needs.  Further, the thesis asks whether the 
implementation of the recently promulgated CJCSI instructions would be more disruptive 
to the DON instead of an alternative modification of what the DON is already using 
successfully. 
This thesis also explores the potential value of the newly formed capability 
planning initiative within the DON.  The Navy initiative is compared to private-sector 
practices to define similarities and to develop additional potentially useful methods.  The 
thesis also explores the potential usefulness of linear programming or mathematical 
decision modeling for the application of weights and values to relate input variables and 
relationships to desired outputs.  Finally, procurement narrative statements in the FY07 
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The purpose of this thesis is to research linking the Programmed Objective 
Memorandum (POM) and Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBES) 
with capabilities.  The reason for doing this thesis was a recent change of focus within 
DoD from focusing on programs to focusing on capabilities.  In order to expand the 
amount of literature available on the subject, a fair portion of this thesis researched 
private sector capability planning efforts.  In addition to the literature, three sources of 
information assisted in this thesis.  Two information sources were from different warfare 
enterprises that are implementing a capability planning methodology; the third source of 
information was from OPNAV. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has three objectives.  The first objective was to study the necessity to 
place the function of linking budgeting, programming and capability selection and 
planning at the top level of an organization.  The section objective was to study the 
validity of linear or goal programming, i.e., mathematical decision models that possess 
assigned values to input variables in a relationship equation used to determine an output 
result, to be used as a tool to assist decision makers in resource allocation decisions 
relating to capabilities.  The third and final objective was to perform a count and report 
results of scores under a hypothesis that if the Navy were committed to linking 
capabilities and budgeting then the words “capability, capabilities, and capable” would 
appear in the budget narratives of the Fiscal Year 2007 Procurement Budget narratives.  
Similar words were also counted as part of this analysis.  The objectives were articulated 
in the initial proposal as the following:   
1. First Objective 
It is hypothesized that if DON and DoD business leadership attempts to push any 
of the functions of goal setting/capability determination, capital investments decisions, 
and programming/budgeting to lower levels in the organization then it risks becoming 
dysfunctional because it will be much harder to coordinate all essential tasks.  To the 
Navy, this assumption or hypothesis is directed at coordination of three decision 
2processes: managing capabilities (goal setting), JCIDS (capital investments), and PPBES 
(programming and budgeting) at the resource sponsor (business) level.  For example, 
NAVAIR has an existing organization that performs this task, which could be an example 
of this process.  Program managers in the Navy may wish to have this process 
implemented in their organization.  The thesis will test the hypotheses above in the field, 
e.g., it will investigate the NAVAIR example as a case in successful implementation 
among other DON and DoD agencies to be determined. 
2. Second Objective 
An intensive literature and real world set of data sources will be identified and 
studied with respect to whether a capability linear programming tool might be useful to 
assist decision makers and DON/DoD analysts. This model and analytic approach will be 
investigated to determine whether and to what extent it can assist decision making on 
resource allocation and acquisition. One example outside the US to be researched is how 
governments of Canada (British Columbia and other provinces) use optimization models 
in the area of maintenance of highways, and how these entities use a goal programming 
model to determine the maximum level of highway maintenance that is needed and can 
be provided relative to established standards and available funding. The inputs for 
highway maintenance are easily measurable as are outputs. How the DON/DoD might 
use of this type of model for resource and acquisition decision making is far more 
challenging. For the Navy and DoD to use such a model successfully it must meet their 
needs and overcome problems including data availability and managerial constraints. 
However, providing examples of successful capability or goal programming models for 
funding allocations will be of benefit in educating DON/DoD decision process and 
leadership.   
3. Final Objective 
Data to be analyzed, at minimum, will include the Navy’s FY07 procurement 
budget narratives with respect to what capability this particular program intends to 
provide. Some analysis has been done already in this thesis project research on a portion 
of the FY07 procurement budget narratives.  Questions to be addressed in further thesis 
research include, for example, what percentage of APN budget narratives includes 
language and data about providing a capability?  For those APN narratives that do not 
3mention a capability, what percentage mentions providing a mission or describes a 
function—or has no description at all?  Finally, it will be determined what percentage 
only describes a weapons platform, e.g., a 44-passenger aircraft.  The research then will 
compare and APN to SCN and other procurement budget narratives and report results. 
C. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
 The research, analysis and conclusions aimed at achieving these objectives are 
organized into the following chapters: 
 Chapter I: Introduction 
 Chapter II: Literature Review, which addresses the first and second objectives. 
 Chapter III: Data Gathering and Analysis of narrative word counts which 
addresses the third objective. 
 Chapter IV: Private Sector Capability Configurations and their significance, 
which addresses the first objective. 
 Chapter V: Limitations in trying to solve multiple capability objectives with a 
goal programming approach which answers the second objective. 
 Chapter VI: Decision makers should choose priorities and be provided perfect 
information which addresses the first and second objectives. 
 Chapter VII: Analysis of the Naval Capability Development Process inside two 
Naval Warfighting Enterprise Pillars and the FYDP, which addresses the first objective. 
 Chapter VIII: Conclusion and Recommendations.  The material used to answer 
the first and second objectives was literature and material provided from the three 
information sources.  The material used to answer the third objective was a word count 
analysis of the FY07 Department of the Navy Procurement line item narrative statements.  
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5II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section is a literature review of how large and complex organizations might 
be able to align budgeting and programming funding decisions focused on achieving 
certain capabilities as the primary objective (as opposed to a more traditional focus such 
as specific capital investments or increases in quantity of something or other) .  Currently 
the Department of Defense is stressing budgeting and programming towards capabilities.  
This is evidenced by the recent publication by DoD of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction 3170.01E on 11 May 2005.  This instruction promulgated the need for a joint 
capabilities identification process to meet the needs of the future. (1)  The services 
generally must live with the consequences of decisions they make about major equipment 
end items for twenty to thirty years.  Poor decisions may impair both national security 
policy objectives and financial management. (2)  To date numerous personnel working in 
the budgeting and acquisitions process within the Department of the Navy (DON) are 
struggling with trying to understand and implement a methodology to conform to the 
intent of CJCSI 3170.01E. 
 Since this process is still new to the military, it will be useful to provide a 
literature review related to the subject of capability and goal planning that has been 
implemented in public and private sector organizations in the past.  The goal of this 
research is to provide insights to personnel working in the budgeting and programming 
sectors of the DON about how this process works and to have potential influence towards 
its development and implementation.   
 When studying literature that describes aligning budgeting and programming 
funds towards capabilities, a couple of themes emerge.  First, adopting a new strategy is 
more difficult for large organizations than for smaller ones.  Larger organizations tend to 
be more formally hierarchical and complex, whereas smaller organizations in some cases 
may still be able to operate through informal networks. ( 3 )  Second, successful 
implementation of strategic change in large organizations requires concerted efforts and 
attention at very high levels in the organization.  Third, under certain conditions and with 
some effort, it is feasible to observe the effects of changes in funding on the performance 
6of certain capabilities.  Finally, capability or related programming and budgeting seem to 
emerge when budgets are expected to be leaner and expectations of performance are not 
supposed to diminish.  In that environment, when faced with budget reductions of a 
horizontal, across the board nature, lack of understanding the nature of core capabilities 
and inability to mitigate reductions in critical areas may undermine the organization’s 
ability to succeed. 
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON CAPABILITIES 
 This part of the literature review defines “capabilities” and illustrates some unique 
aspects or attributes that organizational capabilities possess.  According to CJCSI 
3170.01E Enclosure A, paragraph 2-f, a capability is defined as the following: 
A capability is the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified 
standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to 
perform a set of tasks.(4) 
 Resource-based strategies study the interactions with people and resources that 
create capabilities.  Capabilities are created through the interactions of buyers and 
suppliers across an organizations value chain. (5)  The value chain of an organization is 
the sum of all the primary mission functions and the supporting functions that an 
organization performs. (6 )  Capabilities are created through the use of people and 
resources in the performance of mission-related tasks. (7)  Tasks that are performed 
poorly or do not achieve desired outcomes are unprofitable.  On the other hand, tasks that 
are well executed and achieve desired outcomes are profitable. ( 8 )  However, we 
understand that in government there is no profit, so cost savings may be viewed as a 
proxy for profit.   
1. Path Dependency and Its Development 
Of interest is the notion that organizational capabilities and information flow are 
path-dependent in their development. (9)  That is, in the formation of a capability, there is 
a beginning stage where no one knows how to perform a certain set of practices through 
the application of particular technologies that will achieve or produce increasing returns 
or success.  At this point, there might be more than one way of performing functions to 
achieve success.  Some functions and technologies may be more efficient than others.  
Usually the finding of a particular methodology is affected by seemingly random events 
7such as the decisions made in staff meetings, unexpected early successes of certain 
equipment types, the knowledge that contractors possess, political influences, and so on. 
(10)  However, once a favorable set of practices and technological applications are 
discovered, it is they are likely to be repeated, reinforced and learned throughout the 
organization. (11) 
 As time moves on, it may become harder to change methods in achieving 
increasing returns, even if other more efficient methods exists.  Brian W. Arthur (1988) 
studied path-dependent development in increasing returns where certain practices over 
time become locked-in or hard to undo or change once implemented. (12)  Titled 
“Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events,” the 
article was published in the Economic Journal in 1989. (13)  Arthur demonstrates the 
selection of one technological application over another where both applications 
accomplish the same result.  Of interest is how the first application may be more efficient 
earlier to the user while a second, alternative process may become much more efficient to 
a future user.  Since there are greater returns to initial users in the beginning with the first 
application, the first application is selected over the second one. (14)  The selection of the 
first application is repeated until eventually it is standardized across the organization.  
The first application is selected because, at that time, it was perceived to have greater 
benefit to the users than the second application. (15) 
  The initial preference of one methodology over another may make it costly to 
change to an alternative method with the result that it becomes a “lock-in” and very hard 
to change.  Lock-in means that it is possible to have inferior technologies used even 
though better technologies are available.  An example of such lock-in is the 
standardization of the QWERTY keyboard and AC current. (16) 
 In an economy of increasing returns, a lock-in to one particular technological path 
makes it harder to adjust to a different path. (17)  Often, relatively minor events or 
choices made in early stages can have significant impact.  In the beginning of making a 
choice, it is sound to make more careful and well thought-out decisions.  For example, 
history recounts arguments over the benefits of steam versus internal combustion 
(gasoline) engines in the early 1900s. (18) In retrospect, it is not known if any substantial 
benefit would have occurred if equal emphasis had been placed on steam engines.  In the 
8increasing returns example, there is no guarantee that laissez-faire practices will enable 
the better technology to dominate. (19)  In increasing returns instances, policy adapters 
choose technologies early on which suit themselves but may have put future holders of 
this technology at a disadvantage later on. (20) 
 The CJCSI 3170.01E instruction seems to be cognizant of this potential problem 
when it describes defining new capabilities to resolve warfighting capability gaps.  
Enclosure (A) paragraph 2-f of the order describes defining new capabilities: 
 In describing capabilities to resolve identified gaps, the following 
guidelines are instructive: 
 (1) Capability descriptions must contain the following elements: 
  (a) Key characteristics (attributes) with appropriate 
parameters and metrics, e.g., time, distance, effect (including scale) 
  (b)   Obstacles to be overcome 
 (c)   Supportability including Human Systems Integration. 
 (2) Capability descriptions should be general enough so as not to 
prejudice decisions in favor of a particular means of implementation, but 
specific enough to evaluate alternative approaches to implement the 
capability (21) 
2. Defining Current Capabilities 
 The above definition applies to defining capabilities focused towards warfighting 
gaps.  However, if part of the process in budgeting and programming towards capabilities 
involves defining capabilities that are already in use then perhaps defining capabilities 
that already exist should be tailored in a similar fashion.  That is, existing capabilities that 
existing systems and platforms contribute to should not be defined in favor of a specific 
platform.  It may also be the case that in fulfilling certain capabilities certain platforms or 
systems may need to have their service life extended since no better means has yet to 
emerge to serve the function performed by this system.  Such is the case of the service 
life extension of the Light Armored Vehicle that was described in the USMC gazette in 
September of 1998. Since this was a cost effective employment of resources since the 
existing equipment already achieved the desired capability performance, rather than to 
have to fund and research a complete new replacement end-item. (22) 
9C. CHALLENGES FOR COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 
 The first common theme in literature about capability planning is that complex 
organizations are highly challenged when faced with adopting a new strategy of 
programming towards capabilities or goals.  Most organizations do not have planning 
systems that link strategic planning with budgetary statements. (23)  The main cause of 
this is budgets that are focused on the subunits of an organization instead of the 
organization itself.  What becomes lost in this budgeting process is effective 
communication of budgetary objectives towards the entire organization’s goals.  Extreme 
cases will result in loss of effective coordination between departments of an organization. 
(24) 
1. Maryland Public School System 1988 
 In 1988, the Maryland public school system conducted a study to determine the 
feasibility of implementing a strategic planning methodology. (25)  The study compared 
different sized school systems (26) and found that for larger school systems those with 
20,000 or more students had the most problems with implementing a strategic planning 
process.  Medium and small sized school systems were found to be successful in the 
implementation of this new strategy. (27) 
 In general, the following concerns arose.  Managers held the opinion that the 
process was too labor intensive, however medium and small sized schools were able to 
succeed in its implementation.  Large sized schools were not successful and believed that 
they required additional staffing to be dedicated towards this.  A major conclusion was 
that top level managers in every school system did not have adequate understanding, time, 
and resources available to be dedicated to this process. (28)   
 The study concluded that the Maryland school systems need to overcome the 
following barriers in order to be successful in strategic planning: 
 1.  Public Schools are more politically vulnerable than private sector businesses.  
Many of the public schools’ major decisions are open to public forum.  Managers in a  
school system therefore have to consider several different public viewpoints in making a 
decision, compared to the private sector manager who is mainly concerned with profits. 
(29) 
10
 2.  Goals were ambiguous.  Unless goals are clearly defined, they’re almost 
impossible to measure.  Feedback towards ambiguous goals has little value and might not 
even be relevant to the objectives of the organization itself.  This makes it extremely 
challenging for managers to determine whether they’re successful or unsuccessful. (30) 
 3.  Lack of a clearly defined planning process.  A timeline and schedule had not 
been implemented to achieve the required milestones. (31)  Such milestones would be:  
an analysis of the environment, a determination of the schools current position, 
recognizing a need to make changes, the creation of a capability or strategy decision 
matrix, balancing the organizations strengths and weaknesses against the outside 
environment in relation to different capability courses of action, making a capability or 
strategic decision, implementation, and finally feedback. (32) 
 4.  Personnel need to be trained in the process and adequate resources and time 
needed to be committed to support this process.  Concurrently, political managers must 
approve of the allocation of resources towards this process and thus give more discretion 
to school system managers in budget decisions. (33) 
 5.  Work needs to be done to illustrate the linkages between making a strategic 
change and the influence it will have on different parts and functions of the school system.  
Without this it will not be possible to make a prediction about the outcomes of a strategic 
decision and measure success of that decision with feedback. (34)  
2. Planning and Coordination Challenges 
 Planning becomes increasingly difficult as organizations increase in size. (35)  As 
organizations grow they may need to adopt different planning methods than those that 
worked when the organization was smaller. (36)  As organizations grow in size they 
become more complex and more departments with separate functions are created.  Each 
department will have its own unique focus.  Members of one department may have 
different values and objectives than members in other departments.  Such divergent 
values and objectives make coordinated planning challenging. (37)  
 Coordination in large organizations tends to be more formalized and structured 
than in smaller organizations.  In formal systems, rules and standards emerge for 
handling coordination.  But any amount of rules and procedures will be unable to handle 
every possible situation.  Therefore, the burden on management in handling coordination 
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increases as the size of the organization increases.  Also, size tends to increase 
vulnerability to changes in the external environment, which further confounds the 
planning process. (38) 
 Eventually the number of new situations that emerge makes coordination among 
the varying levels of management ineffective.  When this happens managers may 
implement a new strategy where coordination of the subordinate departments is focused 
on goals or objectives.  These goals are expected to be developed congruently throughout 
an organization so the actions of the different parts of the organization will be more 
integrated. (39) 
 This type of coordinated planning requires tremendous effort, time, resources, and 
corporate knowledge.  It usually entails the use of formalized processes and the 
assignment of dedicated personnel towards the coordination function as their primary 
responsibility.  Subordinate units within the organization may participate in this process 
based on how much of their particular departmental expertise is required to successful 
implement a strategy. (40)   
D. REQUIREMENTS OF TOP LEVEL-COORDINATION: 
 The second common theme in the literature is that successful implementation 
requires concerted efforts and attention at very high levels within an organization.  The 
Maryland Public School study states that a heavy investment and commitment is required 
towards strategic planning in order to make it successful.  A way to accomplish this is to 
have dedicated teams of personnel that are part of the organizations’ administrative 
structure.  Top level managers should identify who is tasked with strategic planning and 
clearly define what they’re responsibilities are. (41) 
1. Budgeting with a Departmental Focus 
 When budgeting has a departmental focus rather than an organizational focus, 
communication within an organization suffers.  Having a departmental focus increases 
risk of a breakdown in coordination between different staff members. (42)  There is a 
method that can link strategic planning with financial statements.  It is the process of 
determining strategic goals, developing and programming action plans (programming), 
with the final step to develop a budget. (43)  If the steps of programming and budgeting 
are disconnected it is possible that an organizations’ programs will not be aligned with its 
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departmental structure. (44)  Conversely, if the processes of aligning strategic goals and 
objectives with programming are done successfully, then the budgeting process should 
involve very little work, since it will only have to support what was produced in 
programming. (45) 
2. Two-Tiered Planning Example by McCaffery (1984) 
 Such a process existed in Canada in 1984, where a two-tiered strategic policy 
making and budgeting process known as the “Envelope Budget System” was used (46)  
This system described by McCaffery,  (1984) had two levels of decision making.  The top 
level, which consisted of the highest appointed government officials, establishes broad 
strategic goals and plans.  Beneath this organization, were four committees, each charged 
with overseeing two policy areas, such as national defense or social welfare.  This system 
was designed to enable multiyear planning and policy initiatives in an orderly manner. 
(47)   
 This two-tiered committee system for financial planning had large scale grand 
priorities being developed at the top level, and micro-priorities developed at the 
committee level covering the policy sectors assigned through the allocation of policy 
envelopes.  New proposals or initiatives percolated up from departments to the 
committees for review.  This two-level system was able to produce a political analysis 
and strategic planning.  It could can provide answers to questions such as if you do X 
next year, will our organization be required to do Y, or how many units should we 
produce next year if we need to accomplish objective X. (48)  Elected politicians 
participated in the top level and full-time civil servants comprised the committee level. 
(49)  All of this is in the past and no longer used but it is still a good example for this 
chapter. 
3. University Goal Setting Example 
 A similar process was implemented by university systems.  Here the head of the 
university system set overarching goals for the organization and the individual presidents 
or deans of each school system either produced or had personnel directly working at the 
top level of the school determine more focused operational type goals to fit the intent of 
the whole university system’s broader goals. (50)  This implementation was successful 
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enough to enable a linear programming model, which proved to be beneficial.  Further 
discussions on the efforts in university systems are found later in this chapter. 
4. Planning Decentralization Creates Satisficing 
 When strategic planning is decentralized, linking budgets with top-level 
objectives has greater risk of dysfunction.  Incremental planning emerges when it 
becomes too challenging to satisfy top-level objectives in a decentralized structure. (51)  
A number of flawed processes occur when decentralizing planning leads to establishment 
of incremental decision making. These flaws (such as “satisficing” – described below) 
occur because lower level planners may only understand a few tasks, information costs 
are high, and it is difficult to coordinate effort among organizational sub-units. (52)   
 Satisficing is the selection of courses of action that may be sub-optimal but are 
good enough in the eyes of the organization.  An individual faced with numerous 
problems to solve may choose to satisfice several of them to save time and effort. (53)  
Individuals may possess limited understanding of their environment and may only be able 
to focus on a few things.  This lack of full understanding can have a negative outcome on 
making a decision.  Finally, information is expensive, (54) not necessarily in terms of 
dollars, but in terms of the time it takes to gather and analyze it.  The cost of information 
is the opportunity cost in time for the individual. When time is limited (as it so often is) 
the choice has to be made to spend time looking for an ideal solution to one or two 
problems or achieving good enough solutions for several. (55) 
 The above paragraph argues for planning to be more centralized than 
decentralized.  Limited cognitive abilities and time constraints impede lower level 
planners’ ability to make optimal goal selection for the organization.  Therefore, it is in 
the best interest of the organization to take on the role of planning at the organizational 
level, since it cannot expect to optimize strategy by decentralizing its planning function.  
Execution could be decentralized once planning is completed.  Planning is the 
responsibility of the top levels of the organization.  Top level planning will prevent 
planning within functional stovepipes.   
5. Game Theory and Incrementalism 
 Related to this point is the study of game theory done in the late 1960s; 
specifically games with incomplete information. (56)  Traditional game theory was 
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grounded in the assumption that decision makers within a particular game were highly 
aware of their surroundings in making their decisions.  Harsanyi won the Noble prize for 
his research in game theory with incomplete information. (57)  A significant finding of 
his work is that selection of strategy by the decision makers in a game is different when 
information is incomplete compared to when information is complete. (58) 
 Incremental planning within organizational sub-units or stovepipes is less likely to 
be connected and uniform across an organization, because of the lack of information 
available to lower level planners.  Planners are unable to consider the effects of their 
decisions on other players and the effects of their decisions on the organization as a 
whole.  In situations where a comprehensive analysis is impossible, people will make 
minor incremental adjustments in order to placate higher-ups.  Small adjustments are 
most likely to be made since, if they have a negative impact, they can be easily changed 
or reversed. (59)  These small changes may or may not be in the best interest of the entire 
organization (60) and may be implemented solely because the only information available 
to the planner is that higher authority is not pleased with the status quo.   
 Furthermore, incremental decision-making may not be a single step process 
within a certain time period.  If a decision is made incrementally and it is not correct, 
then another incremental decision will be made.  Tragically the state of being good 
enough may only mean that pressure from higher up no longer exists.  Another aspect of 
this decision-making process is that not all available alternatives may be analyzed.  The 
bottom line of incrementalism is that this decision-making processes will simply continue 
to cycle through decision-making until a good enough outcome has been achieved, (61) 
time has run-out, or the higher authority has to divert attention elsewhere.   
6.  Summary of Challenges 
 Some organizations may be so large and complex that it is impossible to contain 
all planning, programming, and budgeting decisions within the highest one or two levels 
of the organizations’ structure.  In that case the scope of the organizations structure 
requires that it have additional staffs at lower functional levels such that the actions and 
decisions executed at the lower or functional level would be extensions of decisions made 
at the higher integrated operational level. (62)  
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 This approach still allows large complex organizations to resemble possessing a 
two level planning system with the top level focused on overall long term strategic goals 
and policy objectives and the next subordinate or operational level translating those 
objectives into action programs and budgets in the near term.  This methodology is more 
efficient since the objective is to still have budgeting and programming decisions at the 
highest organization levels, which enables greater congruency between all of these 
decisions. (63)  
E. MATCHING CAPABILITY PERFORMANCE TO FUNDING LEVELS 
 The third theme that came up in the literature is that it is possible to assess levels 
of performance that can be matched with funding levels through mathematical 
programming applications.  This is much easier to do when inputs towards objectives are 
easily measurable.  Goal programming for highway maintenance has been used in both 
the United States and Canada.  It can be assumed that the inputs for highway maintenance 
are very tangible (e.g. tons of gravel, asphalt, machine hours of paving equipment, etc.) 
so building a planning model program for maintaining highways is feasible. (64)   
1.  Mathematical/Linear Programming Methods 
 More abstract than highway planning is the use of mathematical programming 
methods towards goals in a university system.  The university system achieves goal 
programming by performing it at two levels, division level and department level.  At the 
departmental level each function of the division is broken up into different weights and 
values. (65)  The aggregate sum of a department’s missions is represented at the division 
level in a single variable. (66)  Since goal programming in universities is more subjective 
than highway maintenance, it was implemented with a two-step strategy.  The top 
management of the school system set overarching broad goals for the entire school 
system.  These goals were sent to the subordinate levels where the top management of the 
subordinated organization divided their organizations missions into goals that supported 
the goals of the entire university system. (67) 
 Goal programming in U.S. and Canadian highways was found to be useful due to 
the large amount of data involved and the ability to measure activities such as paving and 
resources such as raw materials required. (68)  The financial planning model can be used 
to determine the minimum amount of funding required to achieve and maintain specified 
16
maintenance standards.  This is done to justify requests given to the government for 
funding since they must be justified as being required to sustain an agreed upon level of 
serviceability. (69)   
 Goal Programming is done through a linear programming model that measures 
the allocation of capital budgets. (70)  This model can measure whether a particular goal 
has been met or, if it hasn’t been met, how much this goal has been underachieved.  The 
function treats all goals as being equally important.  The objective of the model is to 
minimize the amount that specific goals are underachieved. (71)   
 Goal programming is done through a two step process, the first step is 
determining the required finances and the second is to determine an achievable level of 
service. (72)  Rarely is it the case that budgets received are budgets requested.  When this 
is the case then step two of minimizing the underachievement of specific goals will prove 
to be the more purposeful. (73)   
2.  Subjective Goal Programming Example 
 The goal programming model used in the university system achieved the same 
purpose as the highway programming model.  However its inputs certainly were more 
abstract and were left to the discretion of top level managers and planners.  The purpose 
of the universities goal programming model was to create optimal portfolios of different 
budget cut options.  An optimal budget cut package is one that minimizes goal reduction.  
Presenting top level management a group of alternative reduction strategies allowed for 
greater decision making flexibility.  Even though its formulation was subjective, when it 
was tested against university systems that did not have such a model, more economical 
resource allocation decisions were made with the universities that utilized a goal 
programming system. (74)  
3.   USAF Resource Allocation Model 
 Within the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force has proposed a Resource 
Allocation Model to be used for capability planning for aircraft maintenance. (75).  This 
example illustrates how capability planning could occur at the departmental level.  The 
article claims that in finding the abstract translation for what a capability that supports 
aircraft maintenance was, the author proposed that elements of its definition were located 
inside the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) Reports. (76)   
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SORTS reports state levels of combat readiness, and at this time it is the 
maintenance units that provide the inputs regarding what is most valuable for supporting 
aircraft maintenance.  Currently maintenance units are asking for certain amounts of 
funding to perform functions that they determine are most necessary.  What is not 
happening is determination at the Major Commander or Flag Officer Level of how much 
maintenance capability is affordable with current budget limits, allocating funding 
towards that capability, and then receiving that capability (77). 
 Currently in the United States Air Force (USAF), SORTS reports demonstrate 
that funding 100% combat readiness is too costly.  However, it is feasible to fund less 
than 100% readiness but still be effective enough to be determined mission capable.  The 
main issue is uncertainty about how to optimize funding allocations in achieving mission 
capable readiness.  Not surprisingly, in this atmosphere of uncertainty, funding reduction 
questions usually receive non-uniform, subjective responses from different respondents. 
(78) 
 Given the complexity of influences on budgeting, it is often hard to pinpoint 
reasons why particular programs receive funding over other programs.  There is no model 
or metric that explains why particular programs are funded and others are not.  Currently 
organizations’ funding shortfalls are not readily translated and seen by budget decision 
making personnel at higher levels.  In order to be successful in obtaining funds, logistical 
requirements will need to be translated into language that is meaningful to budgetary 
decision makers. (79)   
 A method provided by the USAF to translate this is the Resource Allocation 
Model (RAM).  The RAM is usable at the USAF Major Command level for collecting 
inputs, establishing priorities, and determining which shortfalls are funded or not funded 
within budget constraints.  The RAM is based on fundamental capability values which 
are the result of decisions based on inputs from all relevant stakeholders. (80)  Here a 
capability is described as having a range from 0 to 1.1.  A fully operational capability 
achieves a scale of 1.0.  An over-operational capability is reported from 1.01 to 1.10.  
Between .85 and .99 a capability is functional.  Between .70 and .84 a capability is in a 
caution zone, where it is degraded but still functional.  Capabilities scoring less than 0.7 
are considered not mission capable. (81)  
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 In order to achieve these capability measurements there is also a need to quantify 
violations against performance, which can occur if under-funded.  Some violations are 
more severe than others and therefore carry more weight. (82)  Perhaps generating these 
values is somewhat subjective in nature, but if these measurements are applied uniformly 
it may at least establish a standard.  This example provides an illustration of violations 
which occur in funding an activity responsible for aircraft maintenance.  Some of these 
violations are: 
 0.1 capability loss from cost cuts in washing aircraft 
 0.2 capability loss from cost cuts in painting aircraft 
 0.3 capability loss from cost cuts in preventive maintenance inspections 
 0.4 capability loss from cost cuts in corrective maintenance functions. (83)   
 When starting from a fully mission capable maintenance activity of 1.0, taking 
funds away from the corrective maintenance function would make the maintenance 
facility less than capable in performing its mission since it would leave it with a rating of 
0.6.  The most likely course of action for a funding reduction with these weights would 
be to reduce the funding for washing aircraft first, since this would appear to be the least 
critical maintenance task. (84)  
 Establishing capability performance levels in this fashion serves to achieve the 
following objectives.  First, the causes of reductions in capability level are identified.  
Second, funding shortfalls can be prioritized based upon their impact on its capability.  
Third this method fits within the resource allocation process where funded or unfunded 
shortfalls are determined within a budget constraint.  Lastly, the money allocated to a 
shortfall is retraceable; meaning the money or lack of money provided towards a 
capability can be traced to its effects.   
 Having a system that tracks the distribution of money with its effects facilitates 
greater economical planning towards allocation of resources in future decisions.  When 
successfully implemented this process of tracking monetary distributions will develop a 
history that will provide feedback.  The feedback becomes available to further improve 




F.  CAPABILITY PLANNING AND DECREASING BUDGETS 
 The final theme is that capability or goal programming may be implemented in 
anticipation of funding reductions. Both the U.S. and Canadian highway example (86) 
and the goal programming in university example demonstrate that such strategies are 
used in times when funding is expected to be limited in nature. (87)  The intentions of 
such models are to produce the maximum achievable level of performance within a given 
budget. By having this information budget requests become more justifiable since they 
will be matched with achieving certain levels of productivity deemed necessary 
politically. (88)   
 A properly functioning capability budgeting system will ensure that effects of 
funding cutbacks do the least harm to essential mission functions. (89)  Proper strategic 
planning will allow properly focused cut-back decisions.  This may be compared to an 
across the board horizontal cut which pays almost no attention to high impact efficiency 
losses in certain programs or capabilities. 
 According to Zakheim and Ranney (1993), in the 1990s SECDEF and the 
President of the United States (POTUS) realized that threats to the United States are 
different than in previous decades(90).  It was also seen that, in the future, it might 
become necessary to downsize the military to be able to successfully fund other domestic 
programs. (91)  Should available funding for defense decrease but demands for U.S 
participation in foreign policy not decrease, then it may be the case that the ability of the 
U.S. to continue to participate in foreign policy may become compromised.  This 
compromise may occur if, in the process of reducing the defense budget by making force 
reductions in warfighting potential, highly essential capabilities towards meeting existing 
post cold-war threats are reduced, due to a lack of understanding of budget versus 
capability.  Such may be the case in a horizontal reduction in force that produces a 
smaller version of the cold-war military. (92) In fact, the result of many across the board 
cuts taken by DoD in the 1990s reduced warfighting capability. As a consequence, DoD 
was not prepared to fight the global war on terrorism and its budget has had to be 
increased and augmented by supplemental war related appropriations considerably in the 
2000s. (93)  
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G. CONCLUSION OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Capabilities are the outcomes of interactions between personnel, equipment, and 
procedures in the performance of an organization’s mission. (94)  Successful capabilities 
once learned may tend to become ingrained within an organization.  Once ingrained these 
may be too hard to change within an organization.  This is because successful practices 
will quickly spread through an organization especially if accomplishment of objectives 
through its adoption has a measurable impact.  In this situation a less efficient 
methodology may be selected through random events and its initial success over a 
possible alternative process reaps greater rewards in the short term but not in the long  
term. (95)  Therefore, in defining new or existing capabilities, the definitions used should 
be as unbiased as possible. (96) 
 Research suggests that organizations are most successful when the processes of 
goal setting, programming funding decision making and budgeting are integrated.  
Hierarchical and complex organizations may have greater challenges in implementing 
this approach than smaller sized organizations. (97)  Complex organizations need to 
ensure that they dedicate personnel towards this process at two levels, the uppermost 
level and subordinate areas directly below the top level. (98)  Top level planners provide 
a general focus towards goals and make macro-level decisions that affect the 
organizations beneath them.  The subordinate organizations have the more challenging 
task of defining specific capabilities that contribute to the objectives of the top level. (99) 
 Highly successful implementations of capability planning can forecast actual 
levels of performance with available funding.  One way this is done is with linear 
programming.  It may be the case that the inputs are very easy to measure such as units of 
raw material and machine hours. (100)  In the event that it is not easy to measure input 
units the act of defining measurement variables is performed through a two-step 
methodology in complex organizations.  Here the top level develops broad objectives and 
the units directly subordinate to the top level develop specific goals and measurements in 
support of the top levels objectives.  Although these measurements may be subjective in 
nature; when tested, organizations that had implemented a planning model, compared to 
those that had not, made more economical decisions which minimized loss in  
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performance. (101)  However, not in every case is it economically useful to utilize goal 
or linear programming due to competing work-loads and relationship definition 
complexities. (102) 
 It may be the case that capability planning strategy is now being implemented in 
the face of future budget constraints.  If funding cuts drive reductions in force size and no 
analysis is done on the effects of the ability for the DON and other services to perform 
certain essential tasks or functions, readiness may be impaired when it need not have 
been.  A highly functional capability planning system will help ensure that funding 
reductions have minimal impact on organizational performance. (103)  Without a highly 
functional system and understanding of capabilities, an organization leaves itself 
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III. DATA GATHERING AND WORD COUNTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the hypotheses of this thesis was to prove that the Navy is or is not 
currently linking budgeting and programming towards capabilities.  The underlying 
assumption of this hypothesis was if capabilities and budgeting and programming were 
linked then the word “capability,” “capabilities,” or “capable” would appear in the 
narrative descriptions (104) for the budget line items in the 2007 procurement budget line 
item statements as evidence of the level of performance of this linkage.  These words 
appearing in the narratives are assumed to illustrate evidence or managerial interest 
towards describing a budget towards a capability. 
Data was gathered via word search for the following word groups: 
 
Capability or capabilities,  
Capable,  
Mission or Missions,  
Function, Functional, Functions, Functioning or Functionality, 
Provide, Provides or Provided. 
This word search was conducted only in the narrative descriptions found in the 
first pages of each line item budget described in the FY2007 procurement budget 
documents on the Navy’s PBIS website.  The budget summary highlight books were not 
counted in this analysis.  These word groups may have appeared in other parts of the 
different line item budgets but were not counted as being part of the narrative description 
in this study.  The primary rule in counting a word was that it was relevant to the 
descriptive paragraphs of the narrative itself.  The assumption of gathering this data was 
that if budgeting and programming were linked to capabilities then the words “capability, 
capabilities” or “capable” would show up in these narrative statements as evidence of 
linking budget descriptions to capabilities.  In order to be more thorough, other words 
relating to “mission,” “function” and “provide” were counted.   Subjective interpretations 
may have impaired some of the decisions to count or not count words.  For example it 
was realized that the word “providing” was not included as a provide word. 
To provide a higher amount of results for all word categories, when counting for 
the words the total amount of occurrences where each particular word type appeared in 
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the narrative were recorded for every line item.  These were then averaged across each 
procurement area.  For example Procurement Z has three line item narratives and when 
counting for the occurrence of the word “capable,” it appeared zero times in the first line 
item, three times in the second line item and one time in the final line item; therefore the 
average occurrences of the word “capable” in Procurement Z are 133%, 1.33, or 4/3. 
That is, the target word appeared an average of 1.33 times per budget line item.  In 
addition to this scoring effort, the number of line items that had one or more instance of a 
test word was reported.  For the case of Procurement Z, three line items this result would 
be that the word “capable” appeared in two out of the three line items. 
B. TEST ONE 
The first test was to determine the amount of occurrences of the test words.  
Results are the following:  
(1) For APN (Aircraft Procurement Navy), 252 line item narratives were analyzed.  
Results of this analysis were the following: on average the words “capability or 
capabilities” scores 103% across 252 APN narratives but only appears in 124 narratives, 
“capable” scores 14% across all APN narratives but only occurs in 29 of them, the words 
“mission or missions” scores 92% across all APN narratives but only occurs in 114 
narratives, the “function” words score 14% across all APN narratives but only appear in 
28 narratives,  the “provide” words score 128% across all APN narratives but only 
appears in 149 narratives. 
(2) For OPN (Other Procurement Navy) 861 line items descriptions were 
analyzed.  Results of this analysis were the following; on average the words “capability 
or capabilities” scores in 44% of OPN narratives while occurring in 226 of them, The 
word “capable” scores 6% and appears in 46 narratives.  The “mission” words score 
22% and appear in 129 narratives, the “function” words score 10% and appear in 69 
narratives, the “provide” words score 93% and appear in 423 narratives. 
(3) For SCN (Ship Building and Conversion Navy) 204 line item descriptions 
were analyzed. Results are; “capability or capabilities” scores 18% and appear in 28 
narratives, the word “capable” scores 5% and appears in 9 narratives, 19% the 
“mission” words score 19% and appear in 21 narratives, the “function” words score 3% 
and appear in 5 narratives, and “provide” words score 34% and appear in 45 narratives. 
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(4) For PANMC (Procurement of Ammunition Navy and Marine Corps) 280 line 
item descriptions were analyzed. Results of this analysis are the following; the words 
“capability or capabilities” scores in 5% and appears in 12 narratives, the word 
“capable” scores 1% and appears in 3 narratives, the “mission” words score 4% and 
appear in 11 narratives, the “function” words score 4% and appear in 12 narratives, and 
the “provide” words score 34% and appear in 70 narratives. 
(5) For PMC (Procurement Marine Corps) 473 line items descriptions were 
analyzed.  The results of this analysis are the following; the words “capability or 
capabilities” scores 40% and appears in 130 narratives, the word “capable” scores 10% 
and appears in 36 narratives, the “mission” words scores 13% and appears in 48 
narratives, the “function” words score 6% and appear in 26 narratives, and the “provide” 
words score 70% and appear in 219 narratives. 
(6) For WPN (Weapons Procurement Navy), 88 line item descriptions were 
analyzed.  Results of this analysis are the following; the words “capability or 
capabilities” score 35% and appear in 19 narratives, the word “capable” scores 7% and 
appears in 6 narratives, the “mission” words score 22% and appear in 17 narratives, the 
“function” words score 0%, and the “provide” words score 61% and appear in 38 
narratives.   
(7) For all of the combined procurement line items narrative descriptions, 2158 
line item descriptions were analyzed in total.  Results of this analysis are the following; 
the words “capability or capabilities” scores 42% and appears in 539 narratives, the 
word “capable” scores 7% and appears in 138 narratives, the “mission” words score 25%, 
and appear in 340 narratives,  the “function” words score 8% and appear in 140 
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Figure 1.   Combined word search results for the sum of all six FY07 Navy 
Procurement Categories. 
 
The conclusion for the data gathering within the first test under the  assumption is 
that if the Navy was currently linking budgeting and programming with capabilities, then 
the words “capability,” “capabilities,” and “capable” would appear in the FY07 line 
item procurement narratives as evidence, is that this is not occurring.  The other word 
results illustrate further differences in the wording of the narratives between procurement 
areas.  The sample size of this test is large enough so that any subjective misinterpretation 
made in gathering the data is not likely to change the outcome.  All test means possessed 
more than 90% statistical accuracy.   
C. TEST TWO 
A second test conducted was to count those items that did not contain the 
combination of the words “capable,” “capability,” or “capabilities” the following but 
did possess the other test words.  Results of this second test are: 
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Figure 2.   Other than capability word results for six procurement types.  From left to 
right, first column cumulative averages of other words, second column is 
the percentages of line items with other test words, third column 
percentages without, final column total percentage without for entire 
procurement area. 
 
Below are narrative explanations of the second test results: 
(1)  For Aircraft procurement Navy, 78 of 252 line items fit this criterion of 
having the other test words besides “capability,” “capabilities,” or “capable”.  Of these 
78 line items the cumulative average of occurrences of the other test words, “mission,” 
“function,” “provide,” was 141% (column one), where 35 of 78 or 44.3% had at least 
one or more of the other test words (column two), and therefore 43 of 78 or 55.7% did 
not (column three).  For the entirety of Aircraft Procurement Navy 43 of 252 or 17.2 % of 
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the line items did not contain any of the test words “capability,” “capabilities,” 
“capable,” “mission,” “function,” and “provide” (column four). 
(2)  For Other Procurement Navy, 597 of 861 line items fit this criterion.  Of these 
597 line items the cumulative average of other test words was 72.7% (column one), 
where 229 of 597 or 38.3% had at least one or more of the other test words (column two), 
and therefore 368 of 597 or 61.7% did not (column three).  For the entirety of Other 
Procurement Navy 368 of 861 or 42.8% of the line items did not contain any of the test 
words (column four). 
(3)  For Ship Building and Conversion Navy 170 of 204 line items fit this 
criterion.  Of these 170 line items the cumulative average of other test words was 36.3% 
(column one), where 33 of 170 or 19.3% contained at least one or more of the other test 
words (column two), and therefore 137 of 170 or 80.7% did not contain any of the test 
words (column three).  For the entirety of Ship Building Procurement Navy 137 of 204 or 
67.3% of the line items did not contain any of the test words (column four). 
(4)  For Procurement of Ammunition Navy and Marine Corps 264 of 280 line 
items fit this criterion.  Of these 264 line items the cumulative average of the other test 
words was 37.0% (column one), where 67 of 264 or 25.3% contained at least one or more 
of other the test words (column two), and therefore 197 of 264 or 74.7% did not contain 
any of the test words (column three).  For the entirety of Procurement of Ammunition 
Navy and Marine Corps 197 of 280 or 70.4% did not possess any of the test words 
(column four).   
(5)  For Procurement Marine Corps 318 of 473 line items fit this criterion.  Of 
these 318 line items the cumulative average of other test words was 47.0% (column one), 
where 87 of 318 or 27.3% contained at least one of the other test words (column two), 
and therefore 231 of 318 or 72.7% did not contain any of the test words (column three).  
For the entirety of Procurement Marine Corps 231 of 473 or 48.9% did not contain any of 
the test words (column four). 
(6)  For Weapons Procurement Navy 64 of 88 line items fit this criterion.  Of 
these 64 line items the cumulative average of other test words was 69.2% (column one), 
where 31 of 64 or 47.7% contained at least one of the other test words (column two), and  
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therefore 33 of 64 or 52.3% did not contain any of the test words (column three).  For the 
entirety of Weapons Procurement Navy 33 of 88 or 38.0% of the line items did not 
contain any of the test words (column four).   
D. TEST THREE 
The final test was proposed to analyze which narratives only describe a weapons 
platform or system only or have no description at all.  For the most-part no data other 
than speculation of narratives could be obtained for this analysis.  The most cost-effective 
non-biased conclusion available due to resource constraints and high information costs 
balanced with relevance towards the efforts in learning and understanding the capability 
planning process, for this proposed test are the results of test two pertaining those 
platforms that do not possess any occurrences of the test words across the scope of the 
entire procurement category or the column four test results.  Under this criterion results 
of this test are the following: 
(1) For Aircraft Procurement Navy 43 or 17.2% of the 252 line items did not 
contain any of the test words. 
(2) For Other Procurement Navy 369 or 42.8% of the 861 line items did not 
contain any of the test words. 
(3) For Ship Building and Conversion 137 or 67.3% of the 204 line items did not 
contain any of the test words. 
(4) For Procurement of Ammunition Navy and Marine Corps 197 or 70.4% of the 
280 line items did not possess any of the test words. 
(5) For the entirety of Procurement Marine Corps 231 or 48.9% of the 473 line 
items did not contain any of the test words. 
(6) For the entirety of Weapons Procurement Navy 33 or 38.0% of 88 line items 
did not contain any of the test words. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The effort in gathering this data was done primarily to provide an analytical 
background to gain perspective to write this thesis on linking capabilities and budgeting.  
The data itself proves nothing more than a large enough percentage of the procurement 
budget narratives do not possess the words capable, capability, or capabilities as 
substantial evidence to prove that budgeting and programming are linked to capabilities 
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of any particular kind.  The inclusion of the capability words and the other test words 
does show evidence of management attention to narrative wording in different 
procurement areas.  However, one could easily argue that other words could describe 
capabilities such as task, role or contribution.  The data gathering took more than 60 labor 
hours and was done in late June and early July of 2006.  The data may be potentially 
biased in its methodology of word selection since the FY07 Aircraft Procurement 
narratives were studied prior to gathering the data. 
The remaining thesis chapters were developed through asking the points of 
contact about the current nature of capability planning within the Department of the Navy.  
These efforts along with literature research contributed to most of the findings.  The word 
count analysis was beneficial for providing a background about towards the scope of the 




























IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR CAPABILITY 
CONFIGURATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter describes the role of capability configurations in identifying, 
developing and applying capabilities for an organization.  Capability planning is derived 
from the resource-based perspective of management strategy in private sector firms. 
(105)  In capability planning a firm’s assets both tangible and intangible (106) are 
analyzed and defined as means to achieve success in a competitive atmosphere.   
 This type of planning is highly detailed and intensive and requires a total analysis 
of the organization involved coupled with a huge amount of consensus across the entire 
scope of the organization involved in the application of the capability definitions. (107)  
Due to the rigor of this task a dedicated function group of top-level personnel that are 
defined as capability configuration should be created to perform this task. (108)  Very 
recently the Department of the Navy has adopted a form of this strategy for developing 
war-fighting capabilities.  At least two organizations within the Navy have adopted a 
form of a capability configuration to perform this task at their organizational level. (109)  
Although this chapter focuses on private sector practices, it mentions similarities that 
exist within the Department of the Navy.   
 This chapter will first provide background into the definitions and terms utilized 
by private sector capability configurations.  Second, it will provide a summary of the 
management perspective of capability planning and illustrate similarities within the 
Department of the Navy.  Lastly, this chapter will illustrate the processes utilized by 
private sector firms for this endeavor.     
B. BACKGROUND 
 Strategy literature since the 1980s makes the claim that there are two different 
sources of competitive advantage that an organization, firm, or business, can utilize.  The 
first source is from positioning advantage and seizing opportunities.  The second source 
is from the concentration and utilization of valuable resources required to sustain 
competitive advantage. (110) 
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 The second source is known as the resource-based strategy, and it is from this 
strategy where development of capabilities is based.  In the resource-based view of 
strategy, performance is linked to skills, resources, and capabilities possessed by an 
organization which are difficult for its competitors to imitate. (111)  Firms, businesses, 
and organizations create and sustain advantages through developments in efficiency, 
effectiveness, improving organizational economics, the researching of technological 
change and organizational change. (112)  This resourced-based perspective recognizes 
but does not attempt to explain the nature of the isolating mechanisms that enable 
competitive advantages to emerge. (113)  Finally, neither the resourced-based perspective, 
nor the positioning perspective by themselves are able to completely explain or provide 
all of the required knowledge needed to determine how an organization, business or firm 
can succeed and continue to succeed. (114) 
1.  Summary of Private Sector Terminologies 
Asymmetrical characteristics, which are the foundations of capabilities, are the 
means that an organization employs to achieve advantage. (115) These characteristics 
consist of outputs or services, routines or standard operating procedures, knowledge and 
expertise, assets, and relationships. (116) Asymmetrical characteristics are processes, 
expertise, relationships, skills, assets, or outputs that an organization produces, that are 
most likely to be imitated by its competitors.  These generally do not produce any 
advantage but possess the potential to be transformed into resources or capabilities. (117) 
 Asymmetrical characteristics become capabilities when they are developed 
through identifying, building and leveraging expertise, contacts or interactions, and assets 
that provide a positive imbalance that favors the organization.  To be considered 
asymmetrical characteristics these must be unique to the organization or be challenging to 
mimic by competitors, thus making them asymmetrical in nature.  These attributes are 
often hidden (overlooked or undiscovered) within an organization.  When hidden these 
characteristics are not likely to be connected with the creation of value within an 
organization, business, or firm.  If these characteristics remain hidden their potential for 
creating value will never be realized.  Therefore, exploring the causes or sources of what 
creates resources may have merit. (118) 
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Resources are asymmetrical characteristics that currently produce superior results.  
These include reputation, technical skills, scarce resources, exclusive alliances (119) and 
low cost suppliers. (120)  Resources also enable a firm to make strategic decisions.  
Resources come in three types: physical, organizational, and human. (121)  Physical 
resources are tangible resources that are namely equipment, property, and items of 
technology.  Human resources refer to training and experience possessed by service 
members. (122) Organizational resources are the internal systems that an organization 
uses to function as well as the organizations reputation or image. (123)   
The search for and/or the desire to retain competitive advantage entails numerous 
decisions regarding the intended usage of existing assets and the development of new 
assets to perform future tasks. (124)  Resourced-based strategies state that strategic 
decisions should be guided by an understanding of the unique resources that an 
organization has.  An audit of all available resources should be performed by the 
capability configuration.  This audit will provide a large list of assets that produce 
varying degrees of strategic relevance. (125)     
  Capabilities are more valuable than resources.  Capabilities relate to the ability to 
create resources or to apply resources in such a way that makes them more valuable or 
sustainable.  This can include expertise, tacit knowledge, administrative routines, 
operational routines, innovative abilities, and operating ability. (126)     
Core capabilities, also referred to as core-competencies, are those capabilities that 
are the most essential to an organization’s competitive advantage.  These are often 
applied across different products and markets. Core capabilities are systematic and may 
comprise or orchestrate other lesser capabilities.  This aspect of core capabilities gives 
them a greater sense of uniqueness and value. (127)  Core capabilities facilitate (128) the 
creation of sustainable competitive advantages. (129)  These typically have knowledge 
based or technological aspects. (130)  An effective core capability is something that an 
organization can base all of its actions and management decisions towards, such as the 
acquisition of capital or the training of personnel. (131) 
Core capabilities are defined as having four dimensions: employee skills and 
knowledge, technical systems, managerial systems, and the values and norms of the 
organization. (132)  Employee skills and knowledge bear the closest relationship to new 
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product development.  Technical systems are the results of quantifying, decoding and 
building structures out of tacit knowledge.  This process may take years to accomplish 
and is often the combination of several inputs of different sources of tacit knowledge 
across the span of the organization. (133)  Therefore, if applied and accumulated and 
applied properly a technical system built from tacit experience will be of great value.  
Managerial systems are both formal and informal methods of controlling knowledge.  
These evolve over time through the interactions of managers, employees, and the 
organizations rewards systems.  Finally, values are the corporate culture of the entire 
organization; these typically originate from the ideals of the organizations founding 
leaders. (134)   
C. MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE OF CONSENSUS BUILDING 
1. Capability Configuration 
 A capability configuration will be faced with two primary challenges when 
implementing a resource-based strategy.  The first challenge is the sorting out of all 
resources possessed, and identifying those that are sources of competitive advantage.  
The second challenge is coming to agreement upon the application of selected resources. 
(135) 
2.  Objective of a Capability Configuration 
 The objective of a capability configuration is to determine what core capabilities 
the organization possesses or needs to possess.  Not only must core capabilities be 
selected, the capability configuration must reach consensus on their definitions. (136)  
Without consensus a functional decision making process for making resourced-based 
decisions is not likely to occur. (137)   
Consensus building within management is certainly not a fresh topic of research.  
Most research has focused on consensus building towards an organization’s goals or 
objectives, or about the nature of the external environment of a firm.  In this research the 
achievement of consensus has been positively correlated to a number of factors of 
performance. (138)  To date research on consensus building on the utilization and 
planning of firm resources and capabilities has not been studied as heavily, but the results 
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Figure 3.   Current U.S. Naval Warfare Enterprise Pillar Structure.  (140) 
 
3.  Consensus within the Department of the Navy 
 Consensus within the Department of the Navy regarding capability definitions 
seems to be achievable within each of the enterprise pillars of (141) Naval Aviation 
Enterprise (NAE), Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE), Undersea Enterprise (USE), Naval 
Netwarfare ForceNet Enterprise (NNFE), and Naval Expeditionary Combat Enterprise 
(NECE), shown in Figure 4 above.  This might be facilitated by the ability to overcome 
management barriers beneath this organizational level and also by the consolidation of 
each enterprise around a specific type or ‘pillar’ of platform/mission type area.  Within 
the pillars it is challenging to influence information flow and consensus above the pillars 
(142).  At the levels of responsibility above the enterprise pillar level, multiple divergent 
interests are managed and consensus building is still ongoing. (143)   
4.  Fragmentation and “Groupthink” 
 Two major problems that may occur in top management teams are fragmentation 
and “groupthink”. (144)  A fragmented team is composed of individuals pursuing their 
own separate goals with minimal collaboration or sharing of information.  “Groupthink” 
is the tendency towards like-mindedness that undermines true critical analysis.  The 
challenge is to design a process that functions between these two. (145)   
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Figure 4.   Design of Naval Capability Development Process during 2004. (146) 
 
5. Naval Capability Development Process 
Capability Configurations are systems that reinforce the aspects that create and 
sustain core capabilities.  Capability Configurations also sustain and shape the 
organizational design infrastructures where capabilities are embedded, renewed, adapted, 
and supported. (147) These should be positioned at the top management level of the 
organization.  At least two of the five warfare enterprises within the U.S. Navy have 
established a form of the capability configuration; these are the Air Warfare Enterprise 
and the Naval Netwarfare ForceNet Enterprise.  The process utilized by these enterprises 
was originally known as the Naval Capability Development Process. (148)  This process 
was initiated in 2003, first by the Air Warfare Enterprise (149), and has been recently 
implemented in the Naval Netwarfare ForceNet Enterprise under the title of ForceNet 
Capability Development Process (FCP).  ( 150 )  This process centers on defining 
requirements or capabilities needed for warfighting success and defining the requirements 
to support these defined capabilities. ( 151 ) This analysis is forward looking  
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in its nature, looking towards future warfighting requirements and also defining skills and 
assets necessary to succeed in future environments. 
D. PRIVATE SECTOR CONSENSUS BUILDING PRACTICES 
1.  Two-Phase Process and a 0-4 Year Time Horizon 
The following two-phase process appears in an article written by Marino 
(November 1996).  Since not much literature about the public sector capability 
development process is available, for this thesis this process is quoted directly (152).  The 
private sector process takes a thorough internal audit at the applications of current 
resources and processes utilized within an organization or firm or as a step of the 
capability development process.  Also of significant notice is that private sector 




Phase I: Identification of Core Capabilities 
Step    Objective   Major Question         
1. Prepare current -  delineate the markets for - What are we selling, to  
Product/market  each product line.  whom, and how are we 
profile   -  identify principal competitors doing? 
   - establish the contributions of  
each segment to division sales, 
 earnings and asset commitments. 
- review current growth, market 
share and competitive position 
 
2. Identify sources of - identify the cost, product, and  - Why do our customers choose 
Competitive advantage service attributes that explain our products instead of our  
and disadvantage in the current level of performance competitors 
the principle product/  
market segments 
 
3. Determine   - identify the physical and,  - What about our organization gives  
organizational  knowledge assets held or   us cost advantage, superior quality or 
capabilities and   controlled by the division  reliability, after-sale support or  
competencies  that contribute to the   whatever it is that our customers 
   competitive advantages  value? 
   enjoyed. 
- enumerate the organizational 
Skills and abilities that create the 
cost, product, and service  
competitive advantages. 
 
4. Sort out the core - apply tests of wide market - Which of our strengths and  
Competencies and  access, tangible customer  capabilities are most important 
Capabilities  benefits, and difficult imitation for building the future of the 
   to the skills identified in Step 3. organization? 
- sort our core capabilities, i.e.  
those most relevant for product/ 
market decisions 
. 
5. Synthesize and  - combine, restate, challenge, and  - Can we agree on our organization’s 
reach consensus  debate the results of Step 4. core capabilities? 
   -arrive at a reduced set  
   (generally 2-5) of core  
   Competencies and capabilities 
   accepted as valid by the group. 
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Phase 2: Developing and Leveraging Core Capabilities 
 
Step    Objective   Major Question         
6. Assess future  - evaluate likely changes in    - Do our skills and capabilities 
Conditions in existing customer demands in the next  put us in a favorable position to  
Served markets  3-4 years.   serve our customers future  
- determine the relevance oft requirements? 
   Current core capabilities to  
   Meeting these future  
   Requirements 
 
7. Identify emerging - determine likely changes in  - What characterizes markets in 
Markets related to customer demands in the next which our skills provide  
Our skills  3-4 years.   substantial value to the customer 
-determine the relevance of  and opportunities to earn margins 
current core capabilities to that exceed our cost of capital? 
meeting these future  
requirements 
 
8 Formulate  - develop plans to meet the - What do we need to do to   
development plans needs of future capabilities, enable the organization to 
   asset requirements, market achieve its performance  
   opportunities, and product  objectives? 
   extension opportunities 
  
Table 1.   Identification and development of Core Capabilities (154): 
 
2. Three Tasks Method for Capability Development 
A different set of authors (Miller, Eisentstat, and Foote in 2002) described three 
required tasks for capability development that a capability configuration might utilize.  
The first task is to locate asymmetrical characteristics which serve as the basis of 
resources and capabilities and realize their potential for development. (155)  The second 
task is the transformation of asymmetrical characteristics into core capabilities. (156) The 
third and final task is ongoing pursuit of opportunities in which to build upon and 
leverage capabilities. (157) 
a. Task 1: Find Asymmetrical Characteristics and Their Potential 
for Development (158)  
To do well, organizations must develop resources or capabilities that 
cannot be imitated by rivals.  It is challenging to develop these without an understanding 
of potential value or increasing return through implementation.  The first step is finding 
characteristics that create an increasing return.  In most cases, asymmetrical 
characteristics are good starting points for creating advantage since they should not be 
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able to be easily copied by competition. (159)  These differences often develop due to 
interrelations of distinctions and skills that have developed over a prolonged period of 
time. (160)  Sometimes these differences may be concealed, since they are retained as 
tacit knowledge within a firm and thus their connection to success may not be evident. 
(161)   
Due to the hidden nature of asymmetrical characteristics, the search for 
them should be highly thorough and detailed across the entire scope of an organization. 
(162)  This task should lead to understanding how an organization is different from its 
rivals in its execution procedures, assets, and the combinations of employment of them.  
An understanding of how asymmetrical characteristics can be employed to create 
resources and or capabilities that will generate advantages should be attained. (163)   
One method to locate and identify internal asymmetrical characteristics is 
to identify external ones which may be more obvious.  Leaders should look at what kind 
of opportunities they can capture that their competitors are unable to.  These 
characteristics can also be identified though asking why an organization is better than its 
rivals in capturing a particular set of clients or a market.  These answers may be located 
in an organization’s operational reach, reputation, or particular expertise. (164) 
Experimentation may also help in identifying these characteristics.  
Experimentation such as launching several entrepreneurial initiatives, seeing which ones 
show promise, and then trying to determine why these particular initiatives were 
successful over other ones may lead to a clearer understanding of asymmetrical 
characteristics.  Such experimentation may also lead to an understanding of emerging 
characteristics as well. (165)   
Searching internally must also be conducted in order to obtain a complete 
picture of all useful asymmetrical characteristics.  Sometimes these characteristics may 
reside deep inside an organization and will have to be traced back from surface abilities. 
(166)  Two cases are directly quoted out of  Miller, Eisentstat, and Foote (2002) to 
provide examples of how two firms discovered asymmetrical characteristics that lead to a 
core capability.  These cases are again quoted directly: 
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Case of Willamette Incorporated 
Willamette Inc. is a successful medium-sized paper manufacturer.  One of 
Willamette’s apparent strengths was its ability to track the paper market 
by making the right grade of paper at the right time.  However, the 
knowledge of what paper to make is widely available—many competitors 
have it.  The more basic capability is an ability to convert production 
processes quickly and cheaply enough to take advantage of industry price 
changes.  The reason Willamette could do this was because of its flexible 
equipment.  The reason it had such equipment when its competitors did 
not was because of the experience Willamette’s engineers had built up 
over the years converting the dilapidated plants of rivals into some of the 
most flexible and efficient factories in the industry.  Willamette’s 
fundamental asymmetry and its primary source of advantage was its state-
of the-art-plant conversion and operating capabilities-capabilities, it turned 
out, that usually could not be duplicated by the nation’s top engineering 
consultants.  It was this profound recognition of capabilities that then 
allowed Willamette to allocate the human and financial resources and gear 
its hiring, training, promotion, and compensation approaches to support 
them. (167)  
 
Case of Citigroup’s global relationship banking unit 
The case of Citigroup’s global relationship banking unit was instructive 
because of its crucial asymmetry-unrivalled geographic presence-for many 
years represented as much a liability as an asset.  By 1980, Citi had 
developed a system of banks in 100 countries.  Its nearest rival, Hong 
Kong’s Shanghai Bank Corp, had offices in 40 countries.  However, many 
of Citi’s banks were weak, and margins were being squeezed in developed 
countries by competing local banks with better ties to customers and 
government.  Meanwhile in developing countries, market volatility and 
political instability were real and costly hazards.  Despite these problems, 
then CEO John Reed realized that the international network could 
potentially put it in a unique position to do business with far-flung 
multinationals that desired further globalization.  Also, it was unlikely that 
rivals could easily imitate this resource. (168)   
Therefore, identifying asymmetrical characteristics may have at least two 
forms.  The first such as the case of Willamette, requires managers to be able to recognize 
emerging characteristics that may lie in intangible assets such as expertise, routines, 
reputation, and relationships.  These emerging aspects when discovered can refocus an 
organization so that these characteristics are better developed.  The second such as the 
42
case with Citigroup, is the re-framing insight, which is identifying already existing but 
unexploited assets, (169) which once realized can be accessed and exploited.     
b. Task 2: Capability Configurations Creation by Design(170)  
Asymmetrical characteristics develop into core capabilities mainly 
through the design and functions of the organization.  The actions of the organization will 
build and support capabilities by grounding them within the organization. (171)  These 
actions do not happen in a vacuum, rather management and leadership along with the 
design of the organization play a vital role. (172).  Well-managed capabilities will 
increase the performance of an organization.  The objective of capability configurations 
is to manage and create a cycle of continuous improvement of capability enhancement 
that serves to identify asymmetrical traits and shape them into new or towards existing 
capabilities (173).   
The Department of Defense directs the development of Capability 
Roadmaps to build or create capabilities. Mapping serves the function of allowing 
synchronization of determined capabilities as they relate to warfighting outcomes, 
architecture or infrastructure, modeling and simulation or experimentation, product 
evolution and modernization plans.  This planning is being undertaken at the enterprise 
level (174).  A capability roadmap is defined as the following: 
A Capability Roadmap is a living document with a detailed depiction, over 
time, of existing, planned, and desired capabilities across the DOTMLPF 
spectrum, derived from joint concepts.  Capability roadmaps address 
policy, operational concepts, architectures, programmatics with specific 
milestones, net-centric underpinnings, advanced technology, 
experimentation, and system-of system test and assessment, and will be 
used to inform decision makers when considering investment decisions, 
capability determinations, and priorities. (175) 
c.  Task 3: Pursue Opportunities That Build on and Leverage 
Capabilities (176) 
Deeply ingrained capabilities and organizational configurations are of 





audience to be effective. (177)  The greater the amount of situations a capability can 
succeed in, the greater its value. (178) Applying capabilities to multiple situations is an 
ongoing process. 
Private sector firms are encouraged to prioritize their most significant 
capabilities.  What becomes defined as core-capabilities should receive the largest 
volume of resources.  If resources are scarce enough, this methodology may impact or 
hurt other areas, when this is the case it should be documented as a justification for the 
underachievement of a secondary capability. (179)   
Capabilities are constantly changing in their relevance and value.  
Continuous research, undertaken by a capability configuration, towards which core-
capabilities are needed in the future and what characteristics and resources will be used to 
support them is essential. (180)  This aspect makes the process of continuously managing 
and shaping capabilities vital. (181)  Knowledge sharing benefits this process since the 
expertise developed in one capability may be applicable to other capabilities and 
situations. (182) The following table from Miller, Eisentstat, and Foote (2002) shows the 
relationship between design and capabilities: 
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Design  Leadership         Values  Structural         Systems 
Enablers   Governance         and Culture  Mechanisms         and Policies 
 
Embedding Leaders create         Corporate culture Capability-based           Information and    
Capabilities context to         celebrates capabilities units such as task        planning systems 
Within the  prioritize, fund and         and accords prestige forces and cross-        target and track 
Organization build strategy around      to units and people functional Small             capabilities by unit 
  Capabilities.         most central to  Business Unit        product, and so on 
            creating those  (SBU) teams are        versus competitors 
  Top Management         capabilities  established to 
Team (TMT) ensures   create and        Human Resource (HR)      
Synergy among         Collaborative culture share knowledge        systems select, reward 
resources and          to bring together          and promote based 
capabilities          front and back units Multi-SBU,         on capabilities 
     multifunction 
TMT establishes         Emphasis is on coordination        Knowledge systems 
Policies to bring         knowledge building committees        codify proprietary 
Front and back          and knowledge  build and adapt        information on   
units together to        sharing among units capabilities                     technologies, customers, 
develop and adapt             and so on 
capabilities    High-level 
     management 
     committees 
     oversee long-term 
       development of a 
       specific capability 
 
Design  Leadership         Values  Structural         Systems 
Enablers   Governance         and Culture  Mechanisms         and Policies 
 
Enhancing Governance bodies      Informal networks Multi-unit teams        Information systems   
Capabilities describe a trajectory    bring front and  and strategic         feed learning efforts; 
  For core capability      back units and alliance build              e.g., report results 
  extension and               people  together to knowledge                   according to  
  leveraging         develop  capabilities.          segments and 
       Communities of        customers 
       practice grow 
       capabilities         Training programs 
  
Design  Leadership         Values  Structural         Systems 
Enablers   Governance         and Culture  Mechanisms         and Policies 
 
Shaping  Leaders link         Entrepreneurial  Opportunity-based       HR, planning, and    
Capabilities capabilities to         culture encourages units help shape          incentive systems 
To Market target markets and       managers to  capabilities to          create resources that 
Opportunities define policy           identify   market segments          can be easily  
  Parameters for           opportunities            leveraged across  
  identification and         that exploit             opportunities 
  sequencing of               capabilities 
  opportunities               Rewards based on 
         firm-wide objectives 
         to get front and 
         back to collaborate
 




E. OTHER PRIVATE SECTOR CAPABILITY DEFINITIONS 
Previous attempts in defining capabilities can be classified into three categories.  
All categories assume that the use of tangible and intangible assets is the source of a 
firm’s prolonged success. (184)  The first are those that reflect the ability of a firm to 
perform basic functional activities such as distribution logistics and plant layout, and 
marketing campaigns more efficiently than its competition. (185)  The second definition 
of capabilities describes the ability of a firm to improve upon its activities, which is a 
firm’s ability to adapt, learn, and change. The third set of definitions relates to insight or 
the ability to recognize the value of certain resources and/or develop new strategies 
before their competitors do. (186)  These three categories of capabilities describe the 
ability of a firm to perform an activity more efficiently than its competitors whether it is 
static, dynamic, or creative function. (187) 
F. PURPOSE OF THE NAVAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
In the Department of the Navy (DON), the Naval Capability Development 
Process was recently adopted.  It has been utilized within the airframe enterprise 
community at least since 2003, (188) and was recently implemented in the networks 
enterprise community. (189)  Each of these enterprises has a team of personnel who are 
assigned the tasks, which are very much related to the role of a capability configuration, 
of aligning resources and decision making towards capabilities.  The purpose of this team 
is to make top-level decisions for the enterprise, (190) where being at the top level 
provides the leadership governance required to embed capabilities within an enterprise.  
Often this decision making involves budgetary or programming decisions.   
Although these capability configurations have existed for a relatively short time at 
the enterprise level, both appear to be successful at creating a capability planning process 
that fits the unique characteristics of their organization. (191)  Furthermore, both of these 
capability configurations state that the decision-making process in which they are 
involved is continuously being developed, refined and changed. (192) 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
According to additional academic literature on the subject matter; there may exist 
an infinite variety of capabilities, which probably makes it impossible to list mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive types.  Since it is likely to be impossible to list specific types of 
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capabilities, all categories can be defined as socially complex routines that determine 
how effectively a firm can transform inputs into outputs. (193)  This perspective has two 
significant elements.  First is that capabilities are embedded in the routines that are the 
product of the total organizational structure of an organization. (194)  Capabilities are 
located inside the corporate culture, the network of employee relations, and as 
manifestations of the observable structures. (195)  The second element is that capabilities 
function as an organizational complement to efficient practices, whereas better 
capabilities will allow a firm to be more efficient or effectively choose and implement 
methods to deliver service or perform tasks. (196)  These capabilities can be said to 
encompass two aspects, the first being the direct improvement to efficiency and the 
second, the ability to conceive of new ways to succeed. (197)   
Pursuing the logic and understanding of capabilities will never, on its own, 
identify the source of sustainable competitive advantage on account of the blind 
assumption that this understanding will be true.  The source of competitive advantage 
most likely is found at different places, at different times, and in different environments.  
Since competitive advantage is itself elusive, the practice of building organizational 
capabilities to sustain competitive advantage may be challenging, although some 
organizational capabilities may prove to be highly valuable at certain points of time.  
Significant evidence to support a combination and application of certain generic 
capabilities that achieves sustained success over a prolonged period of time has yet to 
emerge. (198)   
Research that lists the numerous varieties of capabilities—and basic prescriptions 
for building capabilities that may have potential in the near future, but may be eclipsed by 
other capabilities as the economic environment changes—would be of value. (199)  
Finally, in the pursuit of sustained competitive advantage, top-level management will 









V. LIMITATIONS IN TRYING TO SOLVE MULTIPLE 
CAPABILITY OBJECTIVES WITH A GOAL PROGRAMMING 
APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses limitations in using linear or goal programming 
approaches to solve multi-objective problems faced currently in the Department of the 
Navy regarding linking budgeting and programming towards capabilities.  This thesis 
defines goal programming as mathematical decision models that possess assigned values 
to input variables in a relationship equation used to determine an output result, to be used 
as a tool to assist decision makers in resource allocation decisions relating to capabilities.  
There are several methods where goal programming is used to solve multiple objective 
problems. Volumes of literature are available on the topic of solving multiple objective 
problems with linear programming, and this chapter mentions a few.   
B. SCARCE RESOURCES AND MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES 
In business, government, and other endeavors, scarcity of resources usually 
prevents achieving one set of objectives without diminishing capacity in a separate set of 
objectives.  If this were not the case, it would be easier to achieve multiple objectives. 
(201) Sometimes more than one goal or objective has to be solved in a simultaneous 
fashion.  ( 202 )  Objectives are rarely independent of each other and management 
decisions usually do not involve solving a single objective.  Objectives are often 
interrelated where a decision to allocate resources to one objective influences another 
objective.  Therefore, the decision to implement one alternative must be studied in 
relation to other alternatives.  One school of thought calls this practice multiple criteria 
decision making (MCDM), (203) 
The usage of MCDM involves making trade-offs between competing objectives.  
The only instance where trade-offs will not be made is where one objective outweighs or 
is of higher significance than all other objectives. (204)  However, in reality it is difficult 




1. Benchmarking Against the Status Quo   
A possible way to benchmark MCDM is to benchmark all objectives against the 
status quo, (205) that is, in a simplified form with all things being equal; in order to 
achieve any level of success the outcome must be better than the status quo, while 
anything less than the status quo would be considered a failure.  Here the status quo is 
defined as the result of not making any adjustments or taking any action at all. (206) 
2. Pareto Optimal Decision Sets 
 When making decisions about the future, separate objectives may not be readily 
identifiable as being better or preferable over a different set of objectives. When this is 
the case, a decision may be made against a “Pareto optimal set,” (207) where the 
decision to move resources towards one objective will significantly diminish the ability to 
achieve a different but seemingly equally significant objective.  A policy maker may have 
to choose between the status quo or an action that will make some individuals better off 
and make others worse off. (208)  There are several methods to facilitate making resource 
allocation decisions by the policy maker; often the quality and availability of information 
has a great influence on this process. (209) 
C. GOAL PROGRAMMING LIMITATIONS 
Linear or goal programming is limited in its potential application, and these 
limitations should be considered when utilizing a goal programming approach as a tool. 
(210)  In order to be purposeful, the following are some of the limitations that may need 
to be overcome when choosing to implement linear-programming as a decision-making 
tool.  First, the user must have a commanding knowledge of the relationships between 
inputs and outputs. (211)  That would mean having perfect or near-perfect visibility of a 
process through its beginning, middle, and final stages.  Second, the relationships 
between the variables must not be in a state of flux, but be steady enough for the model 
once developed to be useful for a measurable amount of time. (212)  Third, the problem 
should be programmable.  For example, there are increasing complexities in developing 
models when the multiple objectives have interrelationships between themselves rather 




challenges in quantifying actual relationships between items such as raw materials, 
processes, and selection preferences, which are sometimes political, into useful variables 
or equations. (213) 
1. Lack of Indivisibility of Inputs 
Goal programming is further limited since it does not account for indivisibility of 
inputs such as results that show a fraction or decimal answer when applied to a quantity 
of end items to be bought or produced, which must be done in whole and complete units. 
(214)  When this is the case then the decision variable needs to be restricted to integer 
outputs instead of decimals.  However, by adding this restriction it may diminish the 
degree of optimization produced by the programming model. (215)  When seeking whole 
number solutions the most logical method is to utilize an Integer Programming 
methodology which provides whole number outputs. (216) 
2. Requirements of Commanding Knowledge 
Goal Programming can be highly useful when the decision maker is “in command 
of the system” described within the function.  That is a thorough understanding of target 
aspiration levels, values, and priorities are possessed by the decision-maker and also the 
writer of the programming function. (217)  Goal programming is also a useful tool when 
applied to reducing computational steps required for large functions when compared to 
other methods. (218)  
3. Challenges in Defining All Possible Solutions 
In its most basic form, linear programming has a single objective function that can 
be minimized or maximized while being subject to certain linear constraints.  While in 
multiple objective programming there is more than one objective function that can be 
either maximized or minimized.  Typically in multiple objective programming there 
rarely exists a solution which will simultaneously optimize every objective. (219) 
In a multiple objective model the process of finding a solution is to find a group 
of non-dominated or efficient solutions.  A dominated solution exists where one solution 
will be dominated or dependent on the outcomes of another solution, that is the solution 




dominated solutions are not dependent on the outcomes of other solutions.  It is feasible 
that the amount of non-dominated solutions may be so large that it is impractical to 
analyze all of them. (221) 
D. LEXICOGRAPHIC MINIMUM PROGRAMMING 
One method utilized in linear or goal programming, in overcoming the challenges 
in clarifying efficient solutions, is to set target aspiration levels that correspond to 
acceptable achievement levels for each specific objective.  This is done to reduce the 
instances of efficient solutions that would result from all goals or objectives being of 
equal value.  In this methodology each and every goal is ranked in priority order.  This 
means that the first goal is solved as close as possible, and then the second goal is solved 
as close as possible, and so on.  A solution that fits this model is called a lexicographical 
minimum. (222)  In order for this model to work, a primary objective must be selected 
and specific aspiration levels must be set for each objective. (223)   
1. Flaws of the Lexicographic Minimum Approach 
A flaw with the lexicographic minimum approach may be accepting a satisfactory 
solution as long as target levels are achieved, (224) while even greater optimization is 
feasible for more than one objective.  Therefore, in this case it would be more logical to 
try to optimize as many objectives as possible beyond the threshold of the acceptable 
criteria; if this is not the case then the fallback position would be to accept an outcome 
that at minimum satisfies the specified target levels.   
A lexicographic minimum formula prioritizes the primary objective over the 
following objectives so that none of the subordinate objectives are calculated until the 
primary objective is maximized. (225)  In an optimization model all of the goals are 
considered simultaneously, where the primary objective will have a higher weight than 
follow-on objectives, but the simultaneous consideration of all possible outcomes with 
weights included may lead to higher overall returns than those which would be limited by 
optimizing the first priority first then moving down the line. (226)   
2. Comparison of Archimedean to Lexicographic Weights 
In Lexicographic goal programming the decision maker is required to specify his 
or her preference of the relative importance of multiple goals. For example, one goal 
would have a weighted value of 50 and another goal would have a weighted value of 30. 
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(227)  Whereas in an Archimedean weighted version of goal-programming the decision 
maker quantifies a preference for all possible results of the goals but without specifying 
exact weight specifications for each goal, rather only which goal is more significant than 
the other goal but not by what degree or relationship between them. (228)  However, an 
improper use of the weighting scheme may do more harm than good making the 
lexicographical solution set a better option.  Free-play of objective selection without 
clearly specifying relationships may lead to disastrous outcomes. (229)  It has been 
observed that the lexicographic or weight selection by the decision maker may be better 
even when preferences are hard to define, since the premise of the lexicographic order is 
that one goal has higher priority than another goal only by the most important criteria for 
which the two goals are different. (230) 
A criticism of lexicographical goal ranking is that ranking the goals prevents 
tradeoff gains that could be realized otherwise.  An alternative is to allow for greater free-
play between goals to make some of the higher priority goals more Archimedean in 
nature, such that an optimal range on the utility frontier is available though the 
competition of the highest priority goals. (231)  On the other hand, as pointed out above, 
too much free play can lead to disastrous outcomes. However, even if the risk of allowing 
free play of too many objectives is not considerable; critics of this form of programming 
state that the tradeoff gains are quite marginal. ( 232 )  Finally, in lexicographic 
programming, even if proper weights are selected, which is a must for an efficient 
solution to be produced, it is only valid or seen as correct after implementing sequential 
steps with proper feedback to the decision maker, (233) or ex poste.  
E. FLAWS OF SOLVING PRIORITY SELECTION WITH PROGRAMMING 
Further applications of goal programming can be used to solve to solve for 
prioritization problems when presented with multiple objective problems. This is referred 
to as the Logarithmic Goal Programming Method. (234)  This is not the only form of goal 
programming that performs this function of selecting priorities; other methods which may 
be far superior to this are the Eigenvector Method and the Logarithmic Least Squares 
Method. (235)  Both of these methods illustrate the decision maker’s lack of clearly 
defined goal preference prior to making the decision. (236)  Each of these two methods 
has advantages in some problem forms and disadvantages in others.  Therefore, if able to 
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implement a goal programming method that can prioritize objectives based upon the 
inputs provided and used, then a choice of methodology should be made when 
approaching the endeavor to select priorities due to the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses between available methods. (237)     
F. ECONOMIC USEFULNESS OF A GOAL PROGRAMMING APPROACH 
The Navy in its current budget framework has divided its structure into the five 
warfare enterprises.  The combination of each of these enterprises defines what the Navy 
does. (238)  Currently the definition of how all of these warfare enterprises are being 
aligned towards the Navy’s objectives and those of recently promulgated Joint 
Capabilities is occurring. (239)  Also at this time, the Joint Capabilities are still being 
defined and have not been firmly established.  Also, the current definitions of Joint 
Capabilities leave room for ambiguity in interpretation. (240)  Furthermore, even if 
capabilities were more clearly defined, it might prove to be challenging to program the 
interrelationships between multiple capabilities while concurrently defining a 
methodology to translate user functional needs statements into a number used in an 
effective capability programming model. (241) 
It is extremely hard to maintain an economic consistency within goal 
programming.  This is because the value of each objective or goal to the decision maker 
is typically in a state of flux. (242)  Generally the dynamic and uncertain aspects of the 
real-world are impossible to quantify in a goal-programming model and this endeavor 
becomes more or less a theoretical goal. (243)  The optimization of multiple goals may 
only exist in our imagination since in most cases it is not feasible for a decision maker to 
make improvements towards one objective without sacrificing the benefit from another 
objective. (244)   
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
A positive aspect of goal programming is that it accounts for the cognitive nature 
of problem solving.  However, since this is done by human beings, it may not be entirely 
rational or omniscient.  Therefore, a difference between a satisfactory solution and that of 
an optimal solution may not be all that different. (245)  Goal programming in its 
formulation relies on user input, the nature of the problem at hand, and is behaviorally 
grounded.  Over reliance on goal programming may lead to misuse if applied incorrectly.  
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If a decision maker does an ineffective job in setting weight values and or sets 
unreasonable target values then the solution will not produce an effective solution. (246)   
In closing, linear or goal programming is limited with its applications, (247) and 
these limitations should be considered when utilizing a goal programming approach as a 
tool in the endeavor to solve a multiple objective problem. (248)  First, the user must 
have a commanding knowledge of the relationships between inputs and outputs. (249)  
That would mean having perfect or near-perfect visibility of a process through its 
beginning, middle and final stages. Second, the relationships between the variables must 
not be in a state of flux. (250)  Third, the problem should be programmable where it is 
possible to define all of the relationships between the inputs and outputs. (251)   
Although it may not be practical to implement goal programming as a solution 
tool in all problem-solving efforts, it will always be practical to seek perfect information. 
(252)  The pursuit of quantifying the relationships in a process and clarifying objectives 










































































VI. OBJECTIVE PRIORITIZATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter focuses on the preference for policy makers to make priority choices 
regarding capabilities over any other means.  It explains the dangers of allowing 
participants in any resource allocation system to operate with minimal information.  
Allowing and enabling the maximum amount of information efficiency to a resource 
allocation process will provide the most positive influence or direction towards the final 
outcome. 
 A great deal of literature is available on the subject of challenges in allocating 
resources within firms consisting of different departments with different objectives. (253)  
Often varying degrees of information flow and the broad range of differing preferences 
are not considered. (254)  The task of allocating resources is complicated by differential 
information and divergent, competing goals between the various departments and their 
headquarters. (255)  Typically, division managers posses greater levels of knowledge 
about their departments than does the headquarters element. (256)   
B. POSITIONING OF EXPERTISE AND KNOWLEDGE 
 The question of how an entire organization is to allocate valuable resources 
among subordinate division is complicated by the fact that division managers usually 
have the most accurate knowledge of their division. (257)  When division managers are 
only knowledgeable of their division and know little else about the rest of the 
organization, they will sometimes inflate or misstate their information submitted to 
corporate headquarters in an effort to retain resources within their division. (258)  This 
distortion of priorities may be further worsened by an institutional rewards system, which 
benefits managers who succeed in garnering more resources during interactions between 
the division and the corporate headquarters. (259)  A potential solution to this dilemma 
may be to have the firm’s departments come to congruence among themselves with 
headquarters not playing an active role except for establishing the parameters within 
which decisions must be made. (260) 
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1. Corporate Headquarters with Perfect Knowledge 
 If corporate headquarters did possess total and complete knowledge of the nature 
and interactions of each department there would be no need for any interaction with any 
of the departments.  In this case, headquarters would select the optimal solution for the 
entire firm.  Then all subordinate departments who would have little grounds to argue 
against this optimal solution. (261)  However, when knowledge is held by division 
managers, the ability of headquarters to derive an optimal solution in a knowledge 
vacuum becomes more challenging. (262) 
2. Unrestricted Autonomous Divisions 
 Autonomous divisions, if left unrestricted, may try to maximize their separate 
profits, which may prove counter to the interests of the organization as a whole. (263)  
Divisional autonomy, however, is challenged by the interdependence between divisions 
for usage of scarce resources. ( 264 )  When this is the case, the problem of 
interdependence of scarce resources between departments is solved and divisional 
autonomy is retained to the largest degree when the combined divisional marginal 
revenues become the marginal revenue for the organization as a whole. (265)  In 
attempting to make a combined effort towards allocation of resources, each division is 
expected to provide a correct and truthful application of their information. (266) 
3. Feasibility of Perfect Knowledge 
 Much of the research on allocation of resources in the public sector is geared 
towards Pareto optimal solution sets, which maximize utility on the production possibility 
frontier.  In the pursuit of Pareto optimal solution sets perfect knowledge of all of the 
independent inputs is a key requirement. (267)  However, virtually all public sector 
enterprises operate in economic environments were achieving perfect knowledge is a 
practical impossibility. (268)    
C. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
 An economic environment may consist of participants and stakeholders in the 
process, the resources present, and the means, availability, and ability to exchange 
information between participants and stakeholders. (269)  Each economic environment 
will possess a resource allocation mechanism, where it may be possible to define or 
control the scheme of resource allocation to the principle participants and stakeholders. 
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(270)  Once a resource allocation mechanism is defined, it carries with it a large potential 
to influence the behavior of the participants of the process. (271) 
1. Strategy Selection by Participants 
 The strategy selected by each participant with respect to which information to 
broadcast to other participants and stakeholders will also be influenced by the amount of 
information already observed and received. (272)  Past and present information received, 
relative position within a resource allocation process, and results of past decisions will 
also have value.  A participant may even go so far as to anticipate the future signals and 
actions of other participants even though the participant may not have any visibility over 
the functions of others. (273)  In the end it is the ultimate combination of all information 
exchanged that shapes the final outcome of a process. (274)   
2.  Information Visibility and Strategic Choice 
Selection of strategy by the decision makers in a game is more than likely to be 
different when information is incomplete than when information is complete. (275)  The 
reason for this change is that a participant in a game with perfect knowledge would select 
a strategy based on what that participant observes about others in the game.  However in 
the case of a game with incomplete information a participant selects their strategy based 
on what they think other players will do with limited or no visibility of the other player’s 
functions.  The purpose of all strategies in all scenarios whether having perfect or 
imperfect knowledge is to achieve a positive or acceptable outcome for the participant 
involved. (276)   
 A game with complete information has greater potential for an outcome of shared 
mutual benefit that satisfies the strategies of all parties involved. (277)  In a situational 
game with incomplete information each participant will select a strategy that is aimed at 
maximizing their expected payoff based on the limited information that can be observed 
about the other participants. (278)  One enterprise has created a common – analytical 
framework to assist in the information exchange for all the participants and stakeholders 
involved in their capability resource allocation process. (279) 
D. DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS 
 In establishing organizational goals organizational behavior scholars state that 
there are six required conditions as follows—quoted from McShane, VonGlinow (2005).  
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 1.    Goals must be specific 
 2. Goals need to be relevant to jobs and functions of an 
organization 
 3.   Goals need to be challenging  
 4. Goals need to be achievable in order to sustain employee 
commitment 
 5.   Participation by employees may be more beneficial 
 6. Feedback to determine if goal(s) have been achieved or 
underachieved. (280) 
 
1.  Purpose of Feedback 
 Of those six characteristics, this thesis will focus on the role of feedback in goal 
establishment.  Without feedback, it is not possible to provide information to correct 
performance shortfalls. (281)  Communication enables coordination, knowledge and 
transmission of managerial decisions. ( 282 )  Feedback is an essential part of 
organizational communication, but is effective only if feedback messages are received 
and acted on. (283) 
 Within organizations workers possess varying beliefs that their efforts will result 
in a achieving a particular level of performance. (284)  In some situations, employees 
may feel that even the highest level of effort will not result in the performance level 
demanded of them. (285)  In order to improve this perception a strategy of clearly 
communicating tasks and matching resources to these tasks is often necessary. (286) 
 Goals are the primary and ultimate objectives that employees within an 
organization are trying to accomplish through their efforts. (287)  Feedback systems are a 
mechanism that is used to see how well an organization is moving towards its objectives.  
Measuring and quantifying feedback is an essential part of quantifying the 
implementation of an action, goal, or purpose. ( 288 )  Objectives and goals in an 
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Figure 5.   CNO N6 SPPV2 slides provided by enterprise 5 August 2006, (290) which 
illustrates Results of Actions or feedback as part of its capability 
allocation strategy. 
 
2.  Significant Enough Time Period to Build Reference 
 Beliefs in the capacity of an organization to achieve results often requires the 
continued measurement over a long-enough period of time and the continued reference 
back to earlier success to reinforce current objectives. (291)  This effort may require a 
trial and error process where, in the short term, assumptions about how to accomplish the 
objective and the desired level of achievement of the objective may prove elusive.  Some 
objectives may require a trial and error period over long enough duration in order for the 
desired level and means to achieve the objective surface. (292)   
3.  Emergence of Useful Metrics Over Enough Time 
 Furthermore, in attempting to achieve a newly defined objective, weights, 
priorities or a means to measure the inputs and outputs of the process (i.e., metrics) will 
need to be established.  In doing so, it may prove that theses initial weights, 
measurements, or priorities themselves may prove erroneous.  But without the effort to 
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establish initial weights and measures the eventual development of the true weights and 
measures and eventual success will not occur. (293)  Therefore, not just the goals 
themselves are important, but the lasting and ongoing process of reinforcing them, even 
in the face of underachievement, is also highly significant. (294) 
E. RELEVANCE TO DON PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING 
 Recently, DoD initiated concurrent Program and Budget review.  This change was  
made in 2001, meaning that it would be implemented in 2002.  Prior to this change, the 
POM was submitted for review in May and then the budgets that were based off of the 
POM would be built.  Now both are due in late August.  (295)  Coordination has become 
less difficult because of this change, but it has not removed all barriers. This reduction in 
coordination barriers was the result of shifting the dependencies of information flow 
between departments in this process. (296)   Shift dependencies occurred because of the 
emergence of a new strategy that necessitated a different of method of information 
exchange among all participants (297) 
1.  Relationship Interdependencies 
 McCaffery and Jones (2004) mention ( 298 ) that three types of task 
interdependence are described by Nadler and Tushman (1988) as pooled interdependence, 
sequential interdependence, and reciprocal interdependence. ( 299 )  Pooled 
interdependence is when almost unrelated and practically independent entities that still 
remain part of a larger parent organization have to share the same resources.  The 
dependence on the same source of resources is what pulls these organizations together.  
This type of interdependence has the lowest apparent coordination and linking 
requirements.  ( 300 )  Sequential interdependence possesses a higher amount of 
coordination and linking requirements than pooled interdependence.  This is because of 
the nature of the work-flow between units.  In the case of sequential interdependence, one 
unit has to depend on the work being completed by a unit ahead of it.  Work units 
involved in this type of interdependence are required to closely coordinate timing of work 
completions by a lead unit so the follow-on unit will start its work in the timeliest most 
efficient fashion. (301)  Reciprocal interdependence means that different work units must 
work concurrently to make a common product.  This imposes even more coordination 
and linking efforts since no single unit can complete its product without the inputs from 
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other work-units.  Reciprocal interdependence requires the most intense coordination 
effort of all types and generates the highest degree of relationship complexity between 
work-units.  (302)   
2.  Sequential Interdependence Prior to 2002 
 Prior to this change, the 2001 change to the Program and Budget review process 
reflected sequential interdependence.  After the change, the process took the form of 
reciprocal interdependence. (303)    In the case of DoD, when the process had sequential 
interdependence, it was perceived as being less efficient.  The shift in methodology in 
effect forced various departments inside DoD to increase their coordination since they 
were now required to do so.  This is evident in that after the reform cuts would be made 
to both the POM and Budget Submission, than prior to the reform where cuts would be 
made to the Budget Submissions only.  (304)  Criticisms of the pre-2002 systems are 
stated by McCaffery and Jones (2004) as the following: 
 
1. Inadequate guidance: it felt the Defense Planning Guidance issues by 
SECDEF to initiate the POM process, which lead to decisions about what 
to fund for the budget year was often late and unaffordable and did not 
provide a clear statement of SECDEF priorities. 
2.  Concurrent process flaws: program and budget processes appeared 
concurrent but not well coordinated. 
3.  Continuous rework: the POM and budget were subject to disassembly, 
rebuilding and review each year. 
4. False precision: programming for the acquisition process required 
excessive detail and was projected too far into the future. 
5.  Revisiting decisions: decisions made during one cycle were not always 
recognized and respected in the next. 
6. Changing rules: rules expectations, and metrics complied with in 
advance by the Navy were changed later in the process to facilitate 
cuts.(305) 
3.  Effects of 2003 Two-Year Cycle Reform 
 In 2003, PPBES was reformed into a two-year cycle from a one-year cycle.  Post 
budget reform means that base budgets are enacted for a two-year cycle. (306)  This 
reform meant that instead of each year having a major review there would be a significant 
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review every-two years, these are known as the on-years.  The years without significant 
reviews are known as off-years.  In the off-years only minor changes are to be enacted.  
(307)  According to McCaffery and Jones (2004), the PPBES system was driven by 
incremental decisions.  (308)  This was likely the case with the process so highly 
fragmented, mandating the 2001 reform to force coordination upon the participants.  If 
any of this incremental behavior carries beyond the 2003 reform of the two-year process 
then the results of decisions now last for two years instead of a single year.  (309)   
 McCaffery and Jones (2004) state that with the two-year cycle the stakes of 
putting together the POM and Budget Estimation Submission (BES) are higher on 
account of results lasting two years.  (310)  The usage of the word "stakes" implies the 
existence of gambling as part of this process.  If it is true that gambling of, or gaming of, 
submissions is part of this process, then it is highly likely that asymmetrical information 
flow, meaning barriers to information exchange, exists in today’s system.  
4.  Comments by Budget Process Participants in 2006 
 Participants in this process have commented that the time allocated for making 
budget decisions decreases as the due date for submitting final information draws closer.  
In fact, as the due date for submitting final information gets closer, the amount of change 
requests imposed upon them increases and the time allocated to make these decisions 
decreases. (311)  In this process, these participants do their utmost best to present clear 
and unbiased information ( 312 ), however, there is not enough time to perform as 
thorough of an analysis as desired towards the end of a cycle. (313)  In addition to thi,s 
there are multiple external stakeholders in the affairs of these participants, all of whom 
possess separate agendas that need to be considered when making budgetary or 
programming choices. (314) 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
 It is conceivable that the coordination demands placed upon budgetary 
participants has become less complex due to the 2001 reform which forced participants to 
coordinate with one-another.  However, this process is still not without its flaws, due to 
the insufficient time allocated to make final last-minute decisions. ( 315 )  If both 
McCaffery and Jones (2004) and Arthur (1988) are correct, then the incremental 
behaviors of the pre-2002 system (316) are likely to still exist within this entire process 
63
because of the lock-in effect (317) of a successful type of practice within an organization.  
Incremental decisions are made by uninformed decision makers (318), and if they are 
performed by well-meaning uniformed decision makers, then these will take the form of 
best guesses.  (319)  
1. Prioritize Objectives Above the Enterprise Level 
 Prioritizing objectives above the enterprise level would provide a basis to which 
all decisions could be grounded against.  It may or may not be feasible to change the 
nature of last-minute decisions due to the amount of stakeholders involved in the process, 
but the endeavor to simplify the decision  process by prioritizing objectives would 
provide clearer information to decision makers who might be caught in a pinch.  Because 
the current strategy creates reciprocal interdependence, this still means that relationships 
between the work-units in the BES and POM process are still highly complex.  The 
pursuit of perfecting information exchange among all participants will provide better 
information to the decision makers who in-turn will be more likely to adopt a strategy of 
reaching a solution that achieves the marginal benefit of all the participants and is in the 
best interest of the parent organization.   
2. Information Flow versus Politics 
 This chapter described three aspects of resource allocation mechanisms that 
influence results and identified to whom they are relevant in the DON.  The first is the 
quantity and quality of information provided to all the participants.  The second is the 
rules or structure of the allocation system.  The third is feedback of the relationships 
between inputs and outputs and the ability to quantify these relationships.  The clearer 
each of these aspects is the easier it becomes for all participants in the resource allocation 
process to reach a desired outcome.  The best way to achieve this is through open lines of 
communication and a clear set of prioritized objectives.  This claim applies to DON 
programming and budgeting since it is apparent that barriers to information flow, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally created, still exist. Further, in the politics of budgeting, 
information transparency and open lines of communication are not always valued above 
other attributes, i.e., those that are used to influence resource negotiation and decision 
making. Budget negotiation inevitably involves some degree of strategic 
misrepresentation. Where this is present then a certain amount of information asymmetry 
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is naturally preferred by those parties who believe their goals will be enhanced through 
use of such strategy in the budget game. (320) Whether a greater focus on capabilities in 
DON and DoD resource allocation decision making will change this to any extent 













VII.  ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS INSIDE TWO NAVAL WARFIGHTING ENTERPRISE 
PILLARS AND THE FYDP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter primarily describes enterprise capability planning in that greater 
clarity of objectives within the near and mid-term planning horizons would be of greater 
benefit to making resource allocation/budgeting and programming decisions easier and 
more measurable.  A detailed study of the composition of an enterprise capability 
planning team may be of value, but since each enterprise is assumed to be an autonomous 
entity a thorough analysis of team composition does not seem as valuable as stating 
common themes observed.  Recently published joint publications have addressed greater 
clarity for mid and near term planning.  However, since this is recent publication it is a 
reasonable estimation that the focus of work effort in clarifying near and mid term 
planning has yet to emerge.   
B. EVOLUTION OF THE NAVAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
 The Naval Capability Development Process (NCDP) is currently evolving and is 
in its early stages of development. (321)  Information liaisons exist between enterprises 
and top level management but the focus of current organizational efforts is on developing 
internal processes within the enterprises themselves. (322)  Challenges exist in mapping 
capabilities that occur in more than one enterprise. (323)  The goal and current end state 
of current capability planning efforts is to provide the most accurate information to 
OPNAV.  (324)   
The objectives of NCDP capability planning efforts in 2004 were the following: 
First, to align platforms and programs to capabilities in order to be able to measure a 
change in a capability with a change in a program.  Second, is to determine where 
capability gaps are and then fill them.  Third, to determine where there is too much 
capability and make necessary reductions. (325) Fourth objective, to provide for a 
balanced strategy that enables investment in future capabilities and maintains warfighting 
wholeness. (326)   
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C. DISCUSSION OF PLANNING TIME HORIZONS  
Currently it seems that capability planning efforts at the Joint level are more 
highly focused beyond the realm of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). (327)  
Capabilities that can be brought into the FYDP might be of greater value to the 
enterprises. (328) Currently in mapping systems to capabilities no weights or values have 
been assigned to any platforms or systems.  One enterprise made an effort to assign 
weights and significance to all of its platforms that it had cognizance over.  Although 
consensus was reached for its POM submission, consensus on capability/platform 
ranking was not achieved.  
1.  Recent Near and Mid-Term Prioritization Challenges 
A large hurdle in this effort was trying to assign a weight to a capability that falls 
within multiple naval warfighting areas as defined by Sea Power 21. (329)  A desire 
expressed in another enterprise was an improvement of the means to better define and 
implement changes in acquisitions, capabilities, and the POM advanced planning of 
JCIDS. ( 330 ) According to CJCSI 3170.01E, Glossary page GL-12 the following 
definition applies to joint tasks which are focused on providing a prioritized list of tasks 
to fall within the scope of the near and mid-term objectives of the FYDP:  
Joint tasks – To ascertain joint capabilities that can immediately direct the 
near and mid-term objectives of the Future Years Defense Plan, joint tasks 
must be determined on an annual basis.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 
coordination with the Services and combatant commands, will prioritize a 
limited number of joint tasks (including capability prototypes) annually 
that are based on combatant commander input, experimentation and joint 
lessons learned.  The joint tasks will be developed to meet the joint force 
objective of full spectrum dominance as informed by the Joint Operations 
Concepts.  The joint tasks will primarily focus on joint military operations 
at the operational and strategic level of war and crisis resolution as 
informed by the Family of Joint Future Concepts.  The development of 
these joint tasks will determine the division of Service responsibilities and 
permit the distillation of quick-win joint capabilities.  The resulting 
Service responsibilities and capabilities from these joint tasks will serve to 
inform programming decisions and the Joint Capabilities Integration and 






2.  Status of Joint Capabilities in 2006 
 A list of Joint Capabilities has been published, but this list is still evolving and 
there is no knowledge of any effort made to have it prioritized. (332)  Currently, Joint 
Capability definitions themselves are ambiguous and it is hard to determine where certain 
functions belong.  For example, tactical air support falls under both Joint Air Operations 
and Joint Fires under Joint Land Operations. (333) 
3.  Near and Mid Term Warfighting Solution Methodology 
According the CJCSI 3170.01B the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System published 11 May 2005 the following process is set forward to 
conduct a capabilities based assessment through four steps to come up with war-fighting 
solutions: 
1. JCIDS Analysis.  The JCIDS analysis process is a capabilities-based 
assessment (CBA) composed of a structured four-step methodology that 
defines capabilities gaps, capability needs and approaches to provide those 
capabilities within a specified functional or operational area.  Based on 
national defense policy and centered on a common joint warfighting 
construct, the analysis initiate the development of integrated joint 
capabilities from a common understanding of existing joint force 
operations and DOTMLPF capabilities and deficiencies.  While a JCIDS 
analysis may be initiated by any number of organizations, to include 
combatant commanders and FCBs, a sponsor needs to be brought into the 
analysis as early as possible.  The term “sponsor,” as used in this 
document, is the DoD component, domain owner or other organization 
responsible for common documentation, periodic reporting and funding 
actions required to support the JCIDS process and acquisition activities 
carried out in accordance with DoD 5000.12 12 May 2003, and National 
Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, 6 October 2003, (e.g., Services, 
agencies, principal staff assistants).  The sponsors must collaborate with 
the combatant commands and FCBs to ensure capabilities are defined 
from a joint perspective.  The analysis is based on the Family of Joint 
Future Concepts CJCSI 3010.02 series.  The resulting analysis also forms 
the foundation for integrated architectures that are developed to structure 
solutions to capability needs. The assistance and advice of appropriate 
FCB working groups should be solicited as early as possible during the 
analysis to facilitate the collaborative effort across many organizations.  
The sponsor-initiated JCIDS analysis provide the necessary information 
for the development of ICDs and joint DCRs the FCBs will  provide 
oversight and assessment of the analysis as appropriate to ensure it is 




Figure 6.   JCIDS Analysis process as defined by the CJCSM 3170.01B, 11 May 
2005 (335) Family of Joint Future Concepts, CONOPS, and Joint Tasks 
are utilized in planning. 
 
 The following information in quotations from CJCSM 3170.01B, spells out the 
role of different inputs utilized during the first stage of JCIDS analysis.  The objective of 
JCIDS is to make the most thorough possible analysis prior to Milestone Decision A or 
prior to the commitment of large amounts of resources and labor-hours. (336)  Of interest 
is the mention of approved concept of operations and joint tasks as part of this first step 
of the JCIDS analysis.   
 
2. Functional Area Analysis (FAA).  The first step in the JCIDS analysis 
begins when the combatant command, FCB or sponsor leads 
performance of an FAA.  The FAA can be self-initiated by a sponsor or 
combatant command based upon an approved concept of operations 
(CONOPS).  The FAA may also be initiated at Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) direction based upon the Family of Joint Future 
Concepts.  An FAA identifies the operational tasks, conditions and 
standards needed to achieve the desired outcome for the military 
objectives.  It uses,  as input, the national strategies, the Family of 
Joint Future Concepts, CONOPS, joint tasks, the capabilities list (e.g., 
Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)), the anticipated range of broad 
capabilities that adversaries might employ and other sources. (337) 
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D. CAPABILITIES APPEAR AS LONG-TERM PLANNING ASPECTS 
ONLY 
 Capabilities are provided for this initial analysis primarily through the Family of 
Joint Future Concepts.  The Family of Joint Future Concepts does not however address a 
near and mid-term time horizon for its capabilities, but that of ten to twenty years out.  
(338)  Therefore, when doing capability planning it appears that most information being 
provided towards the analysis is relevant to ten or more years into the future.  Further 
information on the first step of the JCIDS analysis from CJCSM 3170.01B is spelled out 
as the following: 
a. The Family of Joint Future Concepts and other sources provide a list of 
capabilities and associated operational conditions CJCSI 3010.02 series.  
The FAA identifies the scenarios against which the capabilities and 
attributes will be assessed.  Scenario sources include, but are not limited 
to, the Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) published by OSD.  This 
capabilities list is then scoped in order to make the analysis conducted 
during the FAA manageable.  (339)   
b. The output of the FAA is the list of capabilities and their associated 
tasks and attributes.  The tasks, conditions and standards are developed to 
the level required for analysis in the follow-on functional needs analysis 
(FNA).  The capabilities will be linked to the key characteristics defined in 
the JOpsC.  The FAA includes cross-capability and cross functional 
analysis in identifying operational tasks, conditions and standards and for 
the basis to develop integrated architectures.  The FAA should be 
conducted as a collaborative effort with input from the combatant 
commands, FCBs, Services and agencies.  (340) 
1.  Some Joint Doctrine Capability Terminologies 
CJCSI 3010.02B Joint Operations Concepts Development Process defines 
characteristics as the following, which bears a close relationship to the definitions given 
for resources and asymmetrical characteristics in the previous chapter on the significance 
of capability configurations: 
Characteristic—A desirable trait, quality or property that distinguishes 
how the future joint force should conduct military operations.    
CJCSI 3010.02B defines attributes and capability as the following: 
Attribute—A quantitative or qualitative characteristic of an element or its 
actions 
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Capability—A desirable trait, quality, or property that distinguishes how 
the future joint force should conduct military operations.  (341)  
2.  Joint Operations Concepts Long Term Horizon 
The objective of the Joint Operations Concepts Development Process is focused 
on providing a list of operating scenarios beyond the FYDP 8-20 years in the future.  
Along with the Family of Joint Future Concepts it is to be used in the first step of JCIDS 
analysis.  The Joint Operations Concepts Development Process is described by CJCSI 
3010.02B is the following paragraphs: 
The Objective of JOPsC is to guide the transformation of the joint force so 
that it is prepared to operate successfully 8 to 20 years in the future.  These 
concepts are informed by top-level strategic guidance in the effort to 
identify future capabilities requirements.  JOpsC present a detailed 
description of “how” future operations may be conducted and provide the 
conceptual basis for joint experimentation and capabilities-based 
assessments (CBAs).  The outcomes of experimentation and CBA will 
underpin investment decisions leading to the development of new military 
capabilities beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).  (342) 
3.  Functional Capabilities Board Long Term Horizon 
According to CJCSI 3137.01C The Functional Capabilities Board Process is 
focused 10-20 years in the future, Enclosure C the following applies: 
a. The overarching JOpsC describes how the future joint force will operate 
10-20 years in the future in all domains across the range of military 
operations within a multi-lateral environment in collaboration with 
interagency and multinational partners.  It guides the development of 
future joint concepts and joint force capabilities.  The JOpsC establishes 
the unifying framework for the family of joint concepts, the attributes and 
broad strategic and operational tasks for the future joint force, a campaign 
framework for future operations, the broad context for joint 
experimentation and the conceptual foundation for unified action towards 
implanting the military aspects of national strategy. 
b. JOCs provide the operational-level description of how a joint force 
commander 10-20 years in the future will accomplish a strategic objective 
through the conduct of operations within a military campaign.  This 
campaign links end state, objectives and desired effects necessary for 
success.  The concept identifies broad principles and essential capabilities 
and provides operational context for JFC and JIC development and 
experimentation.   
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c.  JFCs describe how the future joint force will perform a particular 
military function across the full range of military operations 10-20 years in 
the future.  JFCs support the JOpsC and JOCs and draw operational 
context from them.  JFCs identify required capabilities and attributes, 
inform JOCs and provide functional context for JIC development and joint 
experimentation (an example of a JFC is Battlespace Awareness).  FCBs 
develop and maintain JFCs and assist in the development of attributes, 
assumptions, measures of effectiveness and standards that support JCIDS.  
FCBs continually assess their JFCs and relationships with other concepts. 
d.  JICs describe how a joint force commander 10-20 years in the future 
will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve an objective.  A 
JIC includes an illustrative CONOPS for a specific scenario and a set of 
distinguishing principles applicable to a range of scenarios.  JICs have the 
narrowest focus of all concepts and distill JOC and JFC-derived 
capabilities into the fundamental tasks, conditions and standards required 
to conduct a capabilities-based assessment (CBA). Capabilities-based 
assessments apply functional area analysis (FAA), to assess capability 
needs, gaps, overlaps and solutions to support a JIC.  (343)   
E. THE TOP DOWN APPROACH IS FOR ALL TIME HORIZONS IN DOD 
 According to CJCSI 3170.01E a Top Down Capabilities Identification 
Methodology is utilized to determine capabilities for both the near, mid and long term 
objectives of the joint force.  The endeavors that are used for beyond the FYDP are not to 
be used for near and mid-term planning, since these require careful study and the iterative 
process of assessment.  Meanwhile, Joint Tasks and CONOPS are to be used for near and 
mid-term planning.  CJCSI 3170.01E states the following in Enclosure A. 
b. Top Down Capabilities Identification Methodology.  Joint future 
concepts are developed from the top-level strategic guidance, providing a 
top-down baseline for identifying future capabilities.  The Family of Joint 
Future Concepts is used to underpin investment decisions leading to the 
development of new capabilities beyond the Five-Year Defense Plan.  
New capability requirements, material or non-material, must relate directly 
to capabilities identified through the Family of Joint Future Concepts, 
whose hierarchical nature and deliberate process require close examination 
of needed capabilities through an iterative process of assessment.  
Therefore, joint future concepts are not intended to provide 
immediate solutions but proposed solutions that can afford careful 
examination over a more extended period of time.  Concepts of 
Operations (CONOPs) and joint tasks are focused on capabilities 
required in the near-term (now to 7 years in the future).  CONOPSs 
and joint tasks allow the joint community to adjust or divest current 
capabilities by providing the operational context needed to 
72
substantiate current programs.  The objective of this methodology is to 
answer “what do the joint war fighters value?” and “how do we measure 
it?”  The process flow from national level and strategic guidance though 
the concept is shown in the Figure. (344)  
 
Figure 7.   Top Down Capability Need Identification Process that demonstrates the 
role of joint tasks and CONOPs in capability determination inside the 
FYDP. (345) 
 
F. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THIS IN TWO ENTERPRISES 
 Currently, the Aviation warfare enterprise utilizes CONOPS in near and midterm 
or within FYDP capability alignment efforts. (346)  CONOPS are utilized in the NNFE 
enterprise as inputs to their Capabilities Development Process.  However, in the NNFE 
domain specific C4I CONOPS covering net centric operations to date are few in number. 
(347)  Although Joint Tasks have not been seen at the enterprise level, it is perceived that 
the Joint Capability Areas may be a similar surrogate with the potential to be prioritized. 
(348)  Top level budget personnel have not seen Joint Tasks published to date and 
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mention that the Combatant Commanders Integrated Priority Lists are another possible 
substitution to them. (349)  However, neither the Integrated Priority Lists nor JCAs 
appear to be prioritized towards resource allocation decisions. 
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Figure 8.   Enterprise level mapping strategy towards Sea Power 21 and Joint 
Capability Areas during FY2006. (350) 
 
1. The Inability to Map Top-Level Objectives 
 Shown in Figure 9, a warfare enterprise is able to determine which of Sea Power 
21 and JCAs it needs to consider as its own investment priorities.  In the case of the 
NNFE enterprise it has chosen Shaping, Stability Operations and Information Operations 
as its priorities.  However, above the NNFE enterprise none of the Sea Power 21 and 
JCAs appears to be prioritized in their significance, hence the circular depiction of 
capabilities above the NNFE level instead of ranking order.  From this information it is 
challenging to determine what aspects higher authorities are going to make their priorities, 
while it is visible to the observer that this enterprise has chosen to focus on certain areas 
74
with red colored capabilities being most critical, yellow next critical, and green least 
critical.  However, weights or values of relationships regarding all capabilities at this time 
are not known to NNFE. 
2. Usage of CONOPS and Varying Degrees of Success 
 CONOPS can and do play a large role in near and midterm capability alignment 
planning in the Aviation Enterprise. (351)  This is done chiefly in determining how to 
come up with a tactical solution to a particular threat scenario, particularly in warfighting 
analysis.  CONOPS is a large driver in the solution sets of what to invest in towards 
future warfighting capabilities. (352)  This analysis most likely corresponds to the eight 
steps described in Phases 1 and 2 of developing and leveraging core capabilities 
described in Table 1 in Chapter IV.  Joint tasks have only been recently promulgated and 
do not appear in CJCSI or CJCSM instructions prior to 11 May 2005. (353)  Therefore, 
due to the current focus of effort in establishing the capability resource allocation 
mechanism, it is likely that the work of defining the joint tasks and developing C4I 
CONOPS will occur at some point in the future. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
While long-term planning is highly valuable, it appears that both enterprises are 
currently unable to completely quantify and fully articulate weights and values between 
resources and capabilities.  As explained in Chapter V, weights and values may become 
visible after several process iterations in the lexicographic minimum approach.  Having 
weights and values produced by the enterprises may better facilitate the long-term more 
careful analysis prescribed by JCIDS.  Whether further clarity for near and mid-term 
planning becomes available remains to be seen.  If one of the tasks at hand is to measure 
a capability change when a change in status of a particular program occurs, it is not 
known for certain how many iterations of the process will be necessary to make this 
clearer within the rules of the existing allocation construct.  This is especially true if this 
needs to be well-articulated in the near and mid-term. 
1. Prioritized Joint Tasks Do Not Yet Exist 
In conclusion, it appears that the enterprises are able to manage their capability 
planning efforts, but are frustrated by a lack of clarity of information towards what to 
prioritize planning efforts to from above.  Currently efforts are being made to define 
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JCAs and other information at the top level.  This effort is not complete.  Recently CJCSI 
promulgated the use of Joint Tasks as a prioritized list of essential war fighter functions 
to be used for near and mid-term planning, but as far as it can be seen these have not been 
developed or undertaken.   
2. Prioritize the JCAs and Omit the Joint Tasks 
Preferably, although this is not articulated in any manuals, the JCAs should be 
prioritized for the short and mid-term.  JCAs should be prioritized instead of joint-tasks 
due to the path-dependent nature of successful practices with increasing returns. (354)  
Namely, the enterprises are already aligning their efforts towards non-prioritized JCAs.  
Publishing joint tasks as priorities could create greater disruption to the already existing 
and implemented Capabilities Development Processes being utilized and developed.  
Prioritization of the JCAs would probably impose less work for the enterprises and higher 
levels because the development of Joint Tasks may be too much new work. With that said 
the CJCSI 3170.01F manual that will replace today’s CJSCI 3170.01E manual should 







































































VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Department of Defense focuses most of its strategic resource planning efforts 
beyond the time horizon of near-term and mid-term objectives. For this thesis, near- and 
mid-term objectives are considered to be within the realm of the FYDP, or a 0-7 year 
planning horizon.  The recent Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions have advanced 
the concept of prioritizing Joint Tasks as part of the top down capability planning 
methodology to be utilized in conjunction with CONOPS for near and mid term planning.  
Although CONOPS are used and observed now by the JCS, the Joint Tasks do not appear 
to have trickled down to the Naval Warfare Enterprise Pillars nor is there evidence of 
their existence in the Navy enterprise initiative, as described in Chapter VII.  Furthermore, 
it has been expressed by managers performing the function of capability planning at the 
enterprise level, that greater levels of clarity to assist resources planning efforts inside the 
FYDP, in addition to long-term planning efforts, would have significant value.  (355) 
 Recently, the Department of the Navy has adopted the enterprise construct to 
assist in its resource planning efforts.  At the top-level of each of these enterprises a 
function similar to a private sector capability configuration described in Chapter IV, has 
been organized. The process utilized by the enterprises was initially known as the Naval 
Capability Development Process.  This process was first implemented in 2003 in one 
enterprise and is now being implemented by the other enterprises.  For example, the 
Naval Netwar ForceNet Enterprise (NNFE) has named their version of the NCDP as the 
FCP or ForceNet Capability Plan Process.  Finally, the enterprise organization concept 
and cognizance over the implementation of the NCDP process has been restricted to the 
highest command levels in the Navy’s five warfighting enterprises under the assumption 
that pushing this function to any location subordinate of this level would risk having this 
initiative fail, be fragmented or stove-piped. (356) 
 Private sector firms operate for profit in the marketplace.  For the purposes of the 
DoD cost savings may be considered as a proxy for profit.  However, private sector firms 
and DoD are vastly different organizations in mission and function.  The purpose of 
establishing capability configurations in private sector firms is to generate and sustain 
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competitive advantage.  (357)  Private sector capability configurations are designed to 
establish prioritized core capabilities that reach a time horizon 3-4 years into the future.  
The primary desired outcome of this approach is to simplify resource allocation decisions, 
which in turn creates more efficient management decisions relative to the prioritized list 
of core capabilities. (358)  These core- capabilities are then assumed to remain static for 
at least a 3-4 year time horizon.  Meanwhile, the capability configuration is an ongoing 
planning effort managed by a team of top management personnel to monitor, shape, 
predict and organize all aspects of the firm around their consensual and prioritized core-
capabilities.   
 From the resource manager’s perspective, promulgating priorities for allocation 
within a short and mid-term time horizon simplifies the decision making process.  This 
simplification provides many benefits. First, it enables a sound conceptual framework 
which enhances decision making.  Second, if priorities and/or goals are more clearly 
defined then feedback and the measurement of accomplishment of those goals is easier.  
If the weights and values are not known, then a ranking of goals and repeated cycles 
measuring inputs and outputs is likely to be required to ascertain the true relationships 
between goals and desired results, as the federal and defense budget processes operate 
presently in annual cycles for example. 
 Subjective goal programming has taken place within large non-DoD organizations 
where the initial relationships between inputs and outputs are not known, (359) for 
example the University Goal Programming example described in Chapter II. However, it 
is likely that finding relationships between inputs and outputs was an iterative process of 
trial and error over a multiple number of trials where the goals remain static.  Such a 
series of repeated iterations is one example of the requirements necessary for finding the 
true values of input variables and their specific relationships to the final output that 
enables a lexicographic minimum linear goal programming approach to solve a multiple 
objective problems. ( 360 )  This type of linear programming (LP) or mathematical 
decision making is described in Chapter V.  While LP is a desirable approach to defining 
and making decision it is not feasible for DON and DoD for reasons explained previously 
in this thesis. 
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Although applying a goal programming approach to the Department of the Navy’s 
capability planning efforts appears to be infeasible at this time, the intuitive logic for 
defining a methodology intended to find weights and values of relationships to allocate 
resources still applies. However, the part of the current Navy resource allocation process 
developed to identify capabilities appears far too complex to define and program because 
of the inability to accurately quantify actual relationships between raw materials and hard 
assets, and selection preferences, which are sometimes determined politically, into useful 
variables and equations. ( 361 )  However, similar to what is utilized in linear 
programming, one of the objectives of the NCDP is to define the weights and values 
between resources and capabilities.  Therefore, it appears that execution of the NCDP 
may have certain similarities to developing a lexicographic minimum multiple objective 
solving approach. (362)  The similarity between NCDP and lexicographic minimum 
multiple objective solving is that the true (or perhaps clearer) definitions of relationships 
should become more apparent after several iterations or years of execution of the 
capability planning process.  In order to achieve this result accurate feedback is necessary. 
This feedback must be received by the managers of all programs and resources that 
contribute to a particular capability, who possess knowledge of what level of effort was 
provided towards the capability objective.  The feedback that is provided should define 
the relationship between input effort provided and capability performance output.  (363)   
Feedback is facilitated by clearly articulated objectives, which simplifies decision-
making of limited resources.  (364) 
 If more efficient and effective resource allocation is to be established using well-
defined capabilities in the near and mid-term, (i.e., from the present to seven years in the 
future) is a significant enough priority to override other short and midterm objectives for 
the Department of Defense, then one means to achieve this goal is to prioritize 
capabilities within the FYDP.  If this action is not undertaken then there is a greater 
potential for fragmented resource allocation decision-making as described in Chapter II.  
Whether this desire for greater efficiency and effectiveness becomes a significant enough 
issue to cause more careful selection of priorities, a maximum amount of information 
sharing remains essential ( 365 ) due to the relationship complexities of the Navy’s 
capability resource allocation system given the nature of its reciprocal interdependent 
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coordination relationships, as described in the later part of Chapter VI. (366)  As shown 
in Chapter II, budgeting towards capabilities appears to be a trend when budgets are 
reducing and where there is a requirement to sustain necessary levels of performance.  
Evidence of the problems that result from ineffective resource decision making may be 
seen in recent failures in downsizing the military where retention of required warfighting 
capabilities in the 1990s was not achieved, contributing to the need for ongoing 
supplemental budgets in the 2000s.  (367) 
 Clearer definitions of goals that are measurable is of great value to improve DON 
and DoD management and resource decision making.  The new system of enterprises 
mapping shows that enterprises are now more likely to prioritize their goals within their 
enterprise, but it is not certain whether goal setting above this level will be prioritized 
effectively or at all.  Recent directives have promulgated this task at the joint level, as 
described in Chapter VII.  However, due to the short period of time in which this 
endeavor has been implemented and the high level work-load involved to implement and 
construct the capability planning process at the enterprise level, it is too early to speculate 
whether or when the effort of defining joint tasks will be fully undertaken by the DON 
and DoD. 
 It may be the case that the enterprises will be able to better quantify the 
relationships between their programs, resources and capabilities within the current 
decision making construct.  It also may be the case that prioritization of capabilities 
above the enterprise level might assist this process and speed it up.  It may be that a lack 
of prioritization above the enterprise level will make these efforts either highly 
challenging or impossible to accomplish. From the financial manager’s perspective of 
desiring to obtain the highest degree of efficiency within the resource allocation system, a 
conclusion is made here that prioritization of the capabilities for the near and mid term 
planning efforts will better objectify the relationships between the inputs and outputs of 
the system so as to produce more measurable results.  This perspective could be balanced 
with other perspectives relating to near and midterm resource allocation planning in order 
to determine whether certain levels of financial efficiency through prioritization of 
objectives are more desirable than the possession of less financial efficiency with all 
objectives being highly significant and competing against one another.   
81
 Lastly, it may be the case that the capability resource allocation planning system 
will be path-dependent, as discussed in Chapter II, where in once a set of procedures 
becomes established as achieving positive results it is harder to change or unlock such 
learned practices even where there is a genuine desire  to develop a more efficient system.  
Random events early on in the development of decision practices dictate the selection of 
methodologies. (368)  Evidence of the Navy’s capability allocation system and decision 
methodology as being path dependent is demonstrated in the successful development of 
the NCDP process in a single enterprise and follow-on application into other Navy 
enterprises.  Since the capability allocation system is still in its early stages of 
development the question of how to develop the best pathway to defining and 
implementing improvements into the entire allocation process should be considered.   
 Of significant consideration in this regard is the methodology already established 
for aligning programming and budgeting efforts to capabilities in the NCDP process 
instead of planning towards Joint Tasks.  As noted above, once a process becomes 
learned it becomes more difficult to unlearn or un-lock as time moves forward and people 
become used to using the process.  Consequently, it may be easier for the Navy to 
prioritize the JCAs instead of creating the Joint Tasks, since a lock-in on the JCAs may 
have already occurred. (369)  Finally, due to the only recent implementation of the 
capability allocation system, i.e., the NCDP process within the DON Enterprise construct, 
further study will be required to evaluate the desirability of the development, 
shortcomings and successes of this system.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Based upon the findings in the previous thesis chapters and conclusions stated in 
this chapter, the following recommendations are offered to improve the Navy resource 
allocation effectiveness and efficiency: 
 1.  Continue efforts to improve coordination and open lines of communication 
between all DON Stakeholders relevant to the budgeting and programming process with 
respect to development and integration of capability based budgeting.  Although recent 
efforts have been made in DoD in 2001 and 2003 to improve coordination, (370) the 
current capability component within the planning process reflects reciprocal 
interdependence. Therefore, this process bears high and widely dispersed coordination 
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costs. (371)  Due to the high coordination costs of this relationship and potential path-
dependent nature of previous decision system problems that were supposed to be fixed by 
the reforms of the early 2000s, this method continues to evidence some serious 
deficiencies. (372) 
 2.  Continue with the implementation of the Enterprise construct.  Although it has 
only been in effect for a relatively short term, it is a successful organizational planning 
approach at the level it is undertaken.  This conclusion is drawn to some extent based on 
the success of this system in the private sector.  Since it is judged to be successful at this 
point in time, all effort with and above the level of the Navy across DoD to implement 
the Enterprise construct should be made to clearly define, support and, simplify work-
effort for Enterprise capability planning personnel.  The recommended on simplification 
is to establish clearer rules for the allocation process that support the individual autonomy 
of each of the enterprises while enabling a consensus that reflects the combined marginal 
benefits of all the enterprises combined so as to support the objectives of the DON. (373)  
The preferred method for doing this is stated in recommendation 3. 
 3.  If budgeting, programming and capability planning needs to become more 
efficient for the short and mid-term, then prioritization of the JCAs within the FYDP is 
necessary.  This should be done instead of creating, defining, and prioritizing the joint 
tasks, due to the nature of path-dependency  and the already initiated working efforts 
across the enterprises and DON towards linking budgeting and programming of the non-
prioritized JCAs.  In answer of the question of who should prioritize the JCAs, the 
answer, based on the research performed for this thesis, is that DoD should accept this 
responsibility and perform this task.  To answer the follow-up next question of what 
should happen if DoD does not do this, based on the findings of this thesis, the Navy 
should do it to benefit its own planning, programming and budgeting to provide this the 
best and highest quality information to the rest of the services and DoD.  Finally, it needs 
to be stated clearly here that the long-term planning efforts of DoD do not need to be 
abandoned.  Rather, the prioritization of the JCAs is the recommended way to improve 
near and mid-term planning efforts.  Therefore, when CJCSI 3170.01F is published to 
replace CJCSI 3170.01E, then the prioritized JCAs should replace the prioritized Joint 
Tasks and all definitions of Joint Tasks should be omitted from the CJCSI.01F.  Lastly, 
83
this interpretation of the CJCSI.01F version should be published before the any of the 
work to define the Joint Tasks begins, due to the predictable effect of a lock-in effect and 
the potential that implementation of this approach will become counter productive and 
even more burdensome over and above the work-load needed to correct the deficiencies 
in the existing JCAs process..   
 4.  The words “capability,” “capabilities,” and “capable” do not appear 
frequently in the FY07 procurement narratives evaluated in this thesis as evidence (374) 
of budgeting and programming linkage to particular capabilities, as demonstrated in  
Chapter III.  It is indeterminable whether future narratives will or should utilize these 
words to illustrate proof or evidence of linking budgeting, programming to capabilities.  
Choice of methodology for defining these relationships should be left to the discretion of 
DON.  This thesis recommends that such an approach be undertaken and linked to the 
enterprise management framework presently under implementation in the DON.   
 5.  Linear programming and mathematical decision models are not feasible to be 
utilized by the enterprises at this time.  However, the pursuit of finding objective weights 
and values for defining variables and process relationships, similar to those used or 
described by linear programming, is probably worth the effort.  Prioritizing the JCAs 
should enhance the process of better defining the relationships between resources and 
capabilities.  
 6.  Future study is recommended to assess the progress, successes and failures of 
linking the POM and PPBES generally to capabilities within the DON.  Furthermore,  
study of the relationships and interactions of the NCDP or FCP team members in 
prospective coordination with other stakeholders, and how planning documents are 
utilized should be worthwhile as a means for assessing how and where value is added in 
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